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Enforcement of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: 
Remedying “Abusive” Litigation While 
Strengthening Disability Rights 
Evelyn Clark* 
Abstract 
This Note explores the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
the private litigation used to enforce compliance. While the ADA 
was designed to be enforced by private citizens, many have called 
for reform to limit what they see as “abusive” litigants. This Note 
focuses on (1) the perceived problem of vexatious litigants 
abusing the ADA and its state counterparts to benefit monetarily, 
(2) the attempted solutions on both a state and federal level, and 
(3) recommended solutions that focus on protecting the rights of 
individuals with disabilities while limiting abusive litigation 
meant to extort businesses.  
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 690 
II. The Problem ........................................................................ 696 
A. Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
  .................................................................................. 696 
 
 * Candidate for J.D., May 2020, Washington and Lee University School 
of Law. I began my law school career just a year and a half after suffering a 
traumatic T6 spinal cord injury. New to navigating the world in a wheelchair, 
I became interested in disability rights and the legal perspective to 
accessibility. I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and 
love, as well as the many communities that rallied behind me after my 
accident. 
  
690 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 689 (2020) 
 
B. States Awarding Monetary Damages Under the ADA
 .................................................................................. 699 
C. Geographic Concentrations of ADA Litigation ........ 702 
D. Repeat Plaintiffs Filing “Boilerplate” Complaints .. 702 
E. Who Benefits from Repeat Filing? ........................... 705 
1. Repeat Plaintiffs’ Response to Criticism ............ 707 
2. Attorneys Benefitting from Vexatious Litigation
 ............................................................................. 714 
III. Attempted Solutions ......................................................... 715 
A. Judicial Discretion .................................................... 715 
1. Limiting Attorney’s Fees ..................................... 715 
2. Imposing More Strenuous Standing Requirements 
on Plaintiffs ........................................................ 717 
3. Sanctioning Abusive Litigants and Their Counsel
 ............................................................................. 721 
B. Legislative Action ...................................................... 722 
1. State Legislation ................................................. 724 
2. Attempted Federal Legislation ........................... 728 
3. Potential Problems with Legislative Solutions .. 729 
4. Advocates’ Response to Legislative “Fixes” ....... 730 
IV. Recommendations .............................................................. 732 
A. Empower Courts to Exercise Meaningful Judicial 
Discretion ................................................................. 733 
B. Court Approval of Settlements ................................. 736 
C. Notice-and-Cure Legislative Action ......................... 739 
D. Encourage Lawyers to Self-Regulate ....................... 741 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................... 742 
 
I. Introduction 
“This is not a case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it 
is a case brought to extract a money settlement from a restaurant 
in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional 
hook to achieve that goal.”1 
 
 
 1. Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017). 
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“Serial plaintiffs, like Molski, serve as ‘professional pawns 
in an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney’s fees.’ It is a ‘type of 
shotgun litigation [that] undermines both the spirit and purpose 
of the ADA.”2 
 
“The current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially 
driven by economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees.”3 
 
“The Act was never intended to turn a lofty and salutary 
mission into a fee-generating mill for some lawyers to exploit the 
statutory scheme to see how many billable hours they could cram 
into a case before it is either tried or settled. They do a disservice 
to the disabled . . . .”4 
 
“Physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a 
person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.”5 
 
One of these quotes is not like the others. The Americans 
with Disabilities Act was enacted to eradicate discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities, but some say there have 
been unintended consequences.6 The law was designed to be 
enforced by private citizens filing suits against noncompliant 
and inaccessible businesses.7 Unfortunately, Congress did not 
anticipate the unintended consequences of plaintiffs and 
attorneys abusing the system for monetary gain.8 Some courts 
have painted a picture of a vicious “cottage industry”—litigants 
 
 2. Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (citations omitted).  
 3. Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 
2004). 
 4. Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018).  
 6. See id. (providing eight overarching findings, which necessitated the 
creation of the ADA). 
 7. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the 
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens).  
 8. See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the 
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens). 
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and their attorneys abusing the system for monetary gain 
through settlements and attorney’s fees.”9 While some litigants 
may exploit the ADA, many advocates remain committed to 
using the law for its intended purpose:  Achieving equality for 
disabled Americans.10 These individuals and their attorneys, 
regardless of their motives, have faced frequent negative press 
coverage, unpopular public opinion, and increasing beratement 
from courts.11  
Media outlets often tell the stories of greedy individuals 
targeting unassuming small business owners who were 
unaware of the ADA and their noncompliance (despite the law 
having been in effect since 1990).12 The popular podcast This 
American Life produced an episode entitled “Crybabies” in 
 
 9. See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280–82 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004) (arguing that the recovery of attorney’s fees under the ADA has led 
to a “cottage industry” of plaintiffs and attorneys attempting to make money 
off the statute); see also Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 
863 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that this “shotgun litigation” is an ongoing 
scheme to bilk attorney’s fees); see also Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. 
Supp. 2d 1368, 1374–75 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (deciding that plaintiff had not 
sufficiently established a credible threat of future injury and was only involved 
in a “vexatious litigation tactic” to recover monetary damages or attorney’s 
fees). 
 10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining why the ADA 
was enacted).  
 11. See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC),  
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a 
case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a 
money settlement from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the 
ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”); see also Brother v. Miami 
Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“[Lawyers 
exploiting the ADA] do a disservice to the disabled . . . .”); see also Walter 
Olson, The ADA Shakedown Racket, CITY J. (Winter 2004), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/ada-shakedown-racket-12494.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2020) (“The good faith of these complainants in many of these suits is open to 
doubt.”) [https://perma.cc/LHS7-C2D2].  
 12. Amy Shipley & John Maines, South Florida Leads Nation in 
Controversial Disability Lawsuits, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 11, 2014), https://
www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2014-01-11-fl-disability-lawsuits-strike-
sf-20140112-story.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (“Local business owners 
say they are being extorted by a handful of serial-filing lawyers more 
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2010.13 The episode’s description reads: “Crybabies are 
annoying. They whine, they complain, sometimes they ruin it 
for the rest of us. But being a crybaby can be a really effective 
tactic.”14 The third segment of the podcast introduces Tom 
Mundy, a disabled individual and disability rights lawyer who 
has filed hundreds of lawsuits under the ADA.15 The segment’s 
description begins: 
In California, a kind of crybaby cottage industry has popped 
up around, of all things, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act—the federal law that requires public places to meet a 
minimum level of accessibility. Some people make a living by 
suing business owners for not being up to code. Alex 
MacInnis hung out with one of them.16  
The fifteen-minute segment presents a brief but poignant 
case study of how able-bodied people interact with individuals 
with disabilities. Mr. Mundy, a disabled lawyer fighting for ADA 
compliance, takes the journalists to a nearby business to 
demonstrate how frustrating inaccessibility can be.17 He backs 
into an “accessible” parking space, explaining that the striped 
blue lines are not big enough for him to unload the ramp from 
his van and maneuver his wheelchair out of the car.18 Mr. 
Mundy unfolds his ramp to demonstrate.19 The journalist 
immediately questions whether Mundy can actually get out of 
the van or not.20 Then MacInnis states cavalierly, “Well, I’d love 
to see you try.”21 The instant condescension and disbelief of Mr. 
Mundy’s struggle drips from the journalist’s voice.22 Disabled 
 
 13. Ira Glass, This American Life:  Crybabies, WBEZ (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/415/transcript (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/N6BW-5US8]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
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individuals listening to the podcast can likely relate to Mr. 
Mundy’s frustration, not only with the lack of accessibility in 
public places, but with the constant pressure from able-bodied 
individuals to prove one’s disability. 
Throughout the segment, little weight is given to the fact 
that some businesses in the area have fixed their inaccessible 
parking because of Mr. Mundy’s work.23 Instead, the journalist 
narrates, “Tom, like a handful of other people in California, 
makes his living by [suing under the ADA], over and over. He 
has no other job. It’s his sole means of support.”24 Whimsical 
music begins in the background, evoking images of luxury and 
ease, painting Mr. Mundy as a carefree and well-to-do leech on 
the system.25 Litigating under the ADA is depicted as nothing 
more than a money-grabbing scheme for “crybabies” to exploit 
businesses and make millions.26  
As both a wheelchair user and a fan of the show, I was 
shocked and saddened to hear disabled individuals being 
branded as “crybabies” for fighting for equality. This sentiment, 
however, is not rare.27 Countless news articles feature titles 
such as “The ADA Lawsuit Contagion Sweeping U.S. States” 28 
or “Florida’s Serial ADA Lawsuits:  Long Overdue or ‘Legal 
Extortion’?”29 Press coverage almost always focuses on the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Casey L. Raymond, A Growing Threat to the ADA:  An Empirical 
Study of Mass Filings, Popular Backlash, and Potential Solutions Under Titles 
II and III, 18 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 235, 237 (2013) (discussing This American 
Life’s “Crybabies” episode as well as the frequent negative coverage of mass 
plaintiff filings under the ADA). 
 28. See Ken Barnes, The ADA Lawsuit Contagion Sweeping U.S. States, 
FORBES (Dec. 22, 2016 11:05AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016
/12/22/the-ada-lawsuit-contagion-sweeping-u-s-states/#3730448634ee (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (discussing the vast amount of ADA litigation) [https://
perma.cc/MW7V-4BV5].  
 29. See Raychel Lean, Florida’s Serial ADA Lawsuits: Long Overdue or 
‘Legal Extortion’?, DAILY BUS. REV. (Nov. 1, 2018 10:04AM), https://
www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/11/01/floridas-serial-ada-lawsuits-
long-overdue-or-legal-extortion/?slreturn=20190127222824 (last visited Mar. 
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sensationalized and unsympathetic serial plaintiffs who are 
abusing the system, giving little exposure to the view that some 
serial litigants are advocates fighting for equal rights.30 One 
such article states: 
No one exemplifies the emergent disability-shakedown 
industry better than the wheelchair-using Louie, whose past 
includes multiple felony convictions on assault, grand-theft, 
and other charges—though he says he is straight with the 
law today, having after all prospered as one of its enforcers. 
Over the years, he has filed at least 500 lawsuits . . . . Some 
of his individual settlements have reached $100,000 . . . .31 
Negative media coverage has the ability to affect public 
opinion of disability-rights activists, individuals with 
disabilities, and the legal profession that supports them.32 “The 
negative press coverage has even translated into legislation, 
including California’s recently passed law protecting small 
businesses from predatory ADA lawsuits.”33 Legislation has 
repeatedly been introduced on the state and federal level in an 
attempt to curb vexatious ADA litigation.34 Although cries for 
ADA reform may be warranted, legislators hoping to protect 
business interests must remember the fundamental purpose of 
the ADA:  To protect disabled individuals’ right to equal access 
and opportunity.35 
 
25, 2020) (discussing the vast amount of ADA litigation) [https://perma.cc
/X2DT-M2Q3]. 
 30. See Patrick S. Pemberton, Arizona Pedophile Sues 6 SLO County 
Businesses for Alleged ADA Violations, THE TRIB. (Feb. 6, 2015, 6:20PM), 
https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/article39511665.html (last visited 
on Mar. 25, 2020) (“A convicted pedophile from Arizona with a litigious past 
has sued six local businesses, saying their facilities did not comply with the 
[ADA]. Meanwhile, a bill currently pending at the statehouse seeks to limit 
the impact of such lawsuits, which some describe as predatory.”) 
[https://perma.cc/LJF7-BAEE]. 
 31. Olson, supra note 11. 
 32. See Pemberton, supra note 30 (including quotes such as “as a local 
community member I am outraged” and “It’s just so sad hearing about these” 
in an article on ADA litigation). 
 33. Raymond, supra note 27.  
 34. See infra notes 63–76 (discussing proposed and enacted legislation to 
curb vexatious litigation on the state and national level).  
 35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018) (explaining why the ADA was enacted). 
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This Note explores the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
(1) its unintended consequence of abuse in the legal system, (2) 
previous attempts to curb that abuse, and (3) potential 
recommendations to shield businesses from abusive lawsuits 
while protecting disabled individuals’ rights. First, this Note 
will explore why abusive litigation is happening, where it occurs 
the most, who is filing, and who is benefitting. Second, this Note 
will analyze the solutions attempted through state law, federal 
legislation, and alternate means. Third, this Note will propose 
solutions for the legal profession, state and federal legislative 
bodies, and the disability community as a whole. 
II. The Problem 
A. Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to establish a clear and comprehensive 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability.36 The 
ADA’s official acronym is now the ADAAA after it was amended 
most recently in 2008 to reaffirm the broad scope of the term 
“disability.”37 Although the ADA is now the ADAAA, this Note 
will use the acronym “ADA” for ease of reading. 
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public 
accommodations and services operated by private entities.38 
This includes anything from restaurants and bars to hotels and 
gyms.39 Title III states that “it shall be discriminatory to subject 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2018). 
 37. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 110 Pub. L. No. 325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (finding that the definition of disability under the ADA had not been 
interpreted consistently and further narrowed the broad scope of protection 
intended to be afforded by the ADA). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (outlawing discrimination by public 
accommodations and services operated by private entities). 
 39. See id. § 12181(7) (including the substantive list of places of lodging 
(hotels), exhibitions of entertainment (movie theaters), food or drink 
establishments (bars and restaurants), shopping centers (grocery and clothing 
stores), service establishments (laundromats, gas stations, professional 
offices), public displays or collections (museums and libraries), places of 
recreation (parks, zoos, amusement parks), private schools (from nurseries to 
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an individual or class of individuals on the basis of 
disability . . . to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or 
class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an 
entity.”40  
This discrimination includes “a failure to remove 
architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are 
structural in nature, in existing facilities . . . where such 
removal is readily achievable.”41 If an entity demonstrates that 
the removal of a barrier is not readily achievable, it should make 
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations available through alternative methods if such 
methods are readily achievable.42 Factors to determine whether 
an accommodation is readily achievable include the nature and 
cost of the action, the financial resources of the facility, and the 
type of operations of the entity.43 
To enforce the accessibility requirement of Title III, the 
ADA authorizes (1) a private right of action, and (2) a right of 
action by the Attorney General.44 Private plaintiffs initiating 
civil action are entitled to injunctive relief remedying the 
violation and attorney’s fees and costs.45 Injunctive relief 
includes an order to alter facilities to make them readily 
accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities.46 The 
ADA allows for reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation 
expenses and costs, to encourage individuals to file claims and 
keep businesses accountable.47 
 
postgraduate education), social services establishments (day care centers, 
homeless shelters, adoption agencies), places of exercise (gymnasiums, health 
spas, golf courses)). 
 40. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).  
 41. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v).  
 42. See id. § 12181(9) (defining “readily achievable” as easily 
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense). 
 43. Id. § 12181(9)(A)–(D). 
 44. Id. § 12188(b). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 12188(a)(2).  
 47. See id. § 12205 (allowing for the prevailing party to be granted a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs).  
 
  
698 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 689 (2020) 
 
The Attorney General’s right to action differs slightly from 
private plaintiffs’.48 Notably, the court may award monetary 
damages to aggrieved individuals when requested by the 
Attorney General.49 The civil penalty against the entity may not 
exceed $50,000 for the first violation or $100,000 for any 
subsequent violation.50 The court may also consider good faith 
efforts to comply with the Act when considering what amount of 
civil penalty may be appropriate.51  
The differing remedies demonstrate “Congress’s underlying 
intent to prevent private plaintiffs from recovering monetary 
relief under the ADA.”52 To emphasize this intent, Congress 
outlined the specific conditions that may warrant an award of 
monetary damages.53 Monetary relief may be awarded by a 
court to vindicate the public interest in a civil action that was 
brought by the Attorney General.54 “By specifying the 
circumstances under which monetary relief will be available, 
Congress evinced its intent that these damages would be 
available in no other[] [circumstance].”55 Anti-discrimination 
litigation does not allow for recovery of monetary damages 
 
 48. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (explaining the 
differences between the Attorney General’s right to action when compared to 
private plaintiffs’). 
 49. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B) (stating that in a civil action, the court 
“may award such other relief as the court considers to be appropriate, 
including monetary damages to persons aggrieved when requested by the 
Attorney General”). 
 50. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C). 
 51. See id. §12188(b)(5) (defining good faith by allowing the court to 
consider whether the entity could have reasonably anticipated the need for an 
appropriate type of auxiliary aid needed to accommodate the unique needs of 
a particular individual with a disability). 
 52. Carri Becker, Private Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act via Serial Litigation: Abusive or Commendable?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S 
L.J. 93, 97 (2006). 
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2018) (granting courts the ability to award 
monetary damages when requested by the Attorney General or to vindicate 
the public interest). 
 54. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(B)–(C).  
 55. Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
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because plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate the policy of the 
United States, not seek redress of their own injuries.56 
B. States Awarding Monetary Damages Under the ADA 
Some states, however, have enacted their own 
anti-discrimination statutes allowing for the recovery of 
monetary damages for accessibility lawsuits. 57 Plaintiffs in such 
states may “circumvent the will of Congress by seeking money 
damages while retaining federal jurisdiction.”58 For example, in 
California, because a violation of the ADA also constitutes a 
violation of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs can 
sue in federal court for injunctive relief under the ADA while 
collecting money damages under California’s state statute.59  
States that allow for monetary damages under their own 
anti-discrimination statutes experience more accessibility 
lawsuits than those who do not provide for additional recovery.60 
Statistics of geographically concentrated ADA litigation have 
 
 56. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) 
(explaining the difference between statutes allowing for recovery of attorney’s 
fees to encourage litigants and monetary damages). 
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b) (2018) (granting plaintiffs of private civil 
actions the remedy of injunctive relief and attorney’s fees); see also, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(C) (2017) (granting “appropriate relief” including 
intangible damages to plaintiffs in Arizona); CAL. CIV CODE § 52(a) (West 2015) 
(establishing minimum damages of $4,000 to aggrieved plaintiffs in 
California); FLA. STAT. § 760.11(5) (2015) (allowing Florida plaintiffs to recover 
for compensatory damages including mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other 
intangible injuries). 
 58. Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 59. See id. at 862–63 (“Plaintiffs can sue in federal court for injunctive 
relief under the ADA, and tack on state law claims for money damages under 
the Unruh Act and CDPA.”). 
 60. See Minh Vu et al., 2014 May Be a Banner Year for ADA Title III 
Lawsuit Filings, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Aug. 5, 2014), https://
www.adatitleiii.com/2014/08/2014-may-be-a-banner-year-for-ada-title-iii-
lawsuit-filings/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (citing California and Florida as 
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raised concern over plaintiffs’ motivations for filing suit.61 
Repeat plaintiffs’ incentives may be to recover monetarily 
through litigation or settlement rather than enforcing the ADA 
and promoting accessibility.62 
All but a few states have adopted their own version of the 
ADA.63 Most, however, do not allow for additional remedies 
outside of the federal statute.64 For example, the Virginia 
Human Rights Act emphasizes that the policy of the 
Commonwealth is “to safeguard all individuals within the 
Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because 
of . . . disability.”65 The statute has an entire section 
highlighting that the Human Rights Act (VHRA) does not allow 
for additional causes of action.66 “Nothing in this 
 
 61. See Kristina M. Launey et al., ADA Title III Lawsuits Increase by 16% 
in 2017 Due Largely to Website Access Lawsuits; Physical Accessibility 
Legislative Reform Efforts Continue, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.adatitleiii.com/2018/02/ada-title-iii-lawsuits-increase-by-14-
percent-in-2017-due-largely-to-website-access-lawsuits-physical-accessibility-
legislative-reform-efforts-continue/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (noting 
California and Florida as the two states with consistently highest ADA 
lawsuits with 2,751 and 1,488 respectively out of 7,663 suits total in the 
United States in 2017 and New York doubling its 543 lawsuits in 2016 to 1,023 
in 2017) [https://perma.cc/6CLY-C5RB].  
 62. See Cankat v. 41st Ave. Rest. Corp., No. 15 CV 4963 (SJ) (MDG), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171406, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (addressing the 
plaintiff and his attorney’s reputation as serial filers who target small 
businesses that default or settle with nearly identical claims to recover 
monetary damages and attorney’s fees, claiming they “mock” the ADA’s 
mission as a trailblazing civil rights law).  
 63. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum et al., Disability Rights and Public 
Accommodations: State-by-State, SOUTHEAST ADA CTR. (Feb. 2011), https://
adasoutheast.org/publications/ada/public_accommodations_disability_rights
_state-by-state_Final.pdf (“Many states have their own disability rights law 
that complement the Americans with Disabilities Act.”) [https://perma.cc
/KJ38-63ST]. 
 64. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (2014) (explaining that Virginia’s 
statute does not create any additional rights of action from the ADA); with 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (2015) (allowing for actual damages of no less than 
$4,000 for noncompliance).  
 65. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900(B)(1) (2001).  
 66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (2014) (“Nothing in this chapter or in 
Article 4 (§ 2.2-520 et seq.) or Chapter 5 creates, nor shall it be construed to 
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chapter . . . creates . . . an independent or private cause of 
action to enforce its provisions . . . .”67 Causes of action based on 
the public policies of the VHRA are exclusively limited to those 
actions, procedures, and remedies afforded by applicable federal 
or state civil rights statutes.68  
In contrast, Illinois and New York allow for recovery of 
actual damages for injury, loss, or other remedies as may be 
necessary to “make the complainant whole.”69 States may set a 
minimum or maximum amount of damages for which a plaintiff 
may recover.70 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act establishes 
recovery of actual damages of no less than $4,000 in addition to 
attorney’s fees.71 California has also enacted the Californians 
with Disabilities Act, which allows for actual damages of no less 
than $1,000 for those who deny or interfere with enjoyment of 
public facilities.72  
In contrast to California’s minimum penalties, 
Pennsylvania and Florida have set maximum penalty 
amounts.73 Pennsylvania allows for the awarding of actual 
damages including (1) reimbursement of travel expenses related 
to the claim, and (2) compensation for loss of work, but the state 
law sets maximum penalties based on the respondent’s prior 
 
create, an independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions, 
except as specifically provided in subsections B and C.”). 
 67. Id. § 2.2-3903(A). 
 68. Id. § 2.2-3903(D).  
 69. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8A-104 (1989) (allowing Illinois plaintiffs 
to recover for damages to make the complainant whole); see also N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2019) (allowing New York plaintiffs to recover for 
punitive damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate).  
 70. See infra notes 71–76 (explaining how some states have set minimum 
and maximum penalties).  
 71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (2015) (emphasis added).  
 72. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.3(a) (1996) (stating that a person may not be 
liable for damages pursuant to both the CDA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act 
for the same action).  
 73. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959 (2020) (establishing that penalties 
should not exceed $10,000 if the respondent had not committed any prior 
discriminatory practice or $25,000 if the respondent committed one other 
discriminatory practice within a five-year period); see also FLA. STAT. 
§ 760.11(5) (2015) (limiting punitive damages to no more than $100,000). 
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offenses.74 Florida’s Civil Rights Act allows for compensatory 
damages which may include back pay, attorney’s fees, damages 
for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries, 
and punitive damages.75 The statute further specifies that 
punitive damages shall not exceed $100,000.76 
C. Geographic Concentrations of ADA Litigation 
Title III lawsuits have increased dramatically over the 
course of the ADA’s lifetime, especially in states allowing for 
recovery of monetary damages.77 In 2012, there were 2,495 
federal ADA Title III lawsuits, compared to 7,663 in 2017.78 
More suits were filed in federal court in the first half of 2016 
than in all of 2013.79 California and Florida consistently remain 
the top two states for disability litigation, with 2,751 in 
California and 1,488 in Florida in 2017.80 More than one in 
every five federal disabled-access lawsuits in 2013 originated in 
the Southern District of Florida.81 Between 2009 and 2014, 
disabled-access lawsuits in South Florida increased by 500 
percent.82 
D. Repeat Plaintiffs Filing “Boilerplate” Complaints 
Accessibility lawsuits tend to be brought by repeat plaintiffs 
and counsel, who are sometimes working with a disability rights 
organization.83 Many courts have flippantly referred to these 
 
 74. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959 (proposed). 
 75. FLA. STAT. § 760.11(5) (2015). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Launey et al., supra note 61 (analyzing the increase in litigation 
and which states received the most complaints).  
 78. See id. (analyzing the increase in litigation and which states received 
the most complaints); see also Vu et al., supra note 60 (noting an increase from 
2,495 lawsuits in 2012 to 2,719 lawsuits in 2013). 
 79. Vu et al., supra note 60.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Shipley & Maines, supra note 12. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Norkunas v. RNA LLC, No. 3-11-0281, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45456, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2013) (noting that the plaintiff and her counsel 
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litigants as “vexatious.”84 A vexatious suit is defined as a 
“lawsuit instituted maliciously and without good grounds, 
meant to create trouble and expense for the party being sued.”85 
Five hundred and seventy-nine cases were filed by only five 
organizations (and a few of their associated members) in 
Florida’s Middle District.86 Numerous anecdotal cases support 
the assertion that ADA litigation tends to be brought by repeat 
attorneys or law firms.87 Typically, attorneys work with one or 
 
had filed 43 ADA cases throughout the country); see also Rodriguez v. Investco, 
LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting the plaintiff’s 200 
lawsuits over “the past few years” along with the same counsel); see also Access 
4 All, Inc. v. HI 57 Hotel, LLC, No. 04 Civ. 6620 (GBD)(FM), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that plaintiff in the present case 
had commenced more than seventy-five actions alleging ADA violations in the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York); see also Molski v. Mandarin 
Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that the 
plaintiff had filed more than 400 federal lawsuits alleging violations of the 
ADA); see also John D. Meer & Myra B. Villamor, Denying Serial ADA 
Plaintiffs Access to Your Pocketbooks: The Case for Fighting: A Success Story, 
LEXOLOGY (May 29, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=b930b3a3-b5bd-4582-a59d-c3a588b06c87 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2020) (noting that the plaintiff in Martinez v. Columbia Sportswear USA 
Corp., 553 F. App’x 760 (9th Cir. 2013) had filed over 160 similar lawsuits with 
the same attorney)[ https://perma.cc/SJV3-KWUM]; see also Olson, supra note 
11 (noting that in Pennsylvania between late May and the Winter of 2004, one 
firm filed more than one hundred ADA suits on behalf of two complainants). 
 84. See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (declaring the plaintiff a “vexatious litigant”). 
 85. Vexatious Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 86. See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (citing the five organizations as Access 4 All, Inc.; Access Now, Inc.; 
Association for Disabled Americans, Inc.; Access for America, Inc.; and Access 
for Disabled, Inc.). 
 87. See Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Taylor Inn Enters., Inc., 424 F. 
Supp. 2d 962, 967 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that the law firm of Fuller, Fuller 
& Associates in the present case had pursued numerous ADA actions: at least 
forty-one in the Eastern District of Michigan and dozens of actions against 
various hotels throughout New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and D.C.); 
Access 4 All, Inc. v. HI 57 Hotel, LLC, No. 04 Civ. 6620 (GBD)(FM), 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that Fuller, Fuller & 
Associates had represented plaintiffs in at least ninety-two ADA actions in the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York between 2004 and 2006); Molski 
v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating 
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two plaintiffs to bring numerous ADA suits.88 “Just five 
attorneys and a handful of plaintiffs brought almost two thirds 
of the nearly 700 disabled-access suits in Florida’s southern 
district in 2013.”89 
These statistics give rise to the term “career plaintiffs,” 
alleging that many litigants make their living from suing 
businesses under the ADA and its state counterparts.90 One 
attorney indicated at a hearing that her client traveled the 
southeastern United States looking for establishments that fail 
to satisfy ADA requirements.91 The client then contacted 
Accessibility Disability Consultants and obtained counsel to file 
suit.92 In that case, the court was left with the “inescapable 
conclusion” that plaintiff and his counsel were “engaging in 
legalized extortion.”93 The court also noted, “[I]t seems unlikely 
that Congress intended the ADA to be used as a hammer with 
which to extort fees and costs from non-compliant 
establishments.”94  
The widespread practice of filing large numbers of suits 
under ADA’s Title III and then joining state law claims for 
damages has drawn the notice and commentary of a number of 
courts.95 Courts that chastise repeat plaintiffs point to their 
 
that the counsel in the present case had filed at least 223 ADA violation 
lawsuits). 
 88. See Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (asserting 
that the law firm in the present case was counsel of record in at least forty-
one ADA cases filed in the Eastern District of Michigan and of those, at least 
thirty were brought by the same plaintiffs). 
 89. Shipley & Maines, supra note 12. 
 90. See Glass, supra note 13 (interviewing one plaintiff who “has no other 
job” than filing ADA suits). 
 91. See Hoewischer v. Mardini, No. 3:12-cv-3-J-20JRK, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 186558, at *10–11 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2012) (“At the hearing, Counsel 
indicated that her client, Norman Hoewischer, travels the southeastern 
United States looking for establishments which fail to satisfy ADA 
requirements.”). 
 92. Id. at *10–11. 
 93. Id. at *10. 
 94. See id. at *11 (expressing concern that the plaintiff’s main motivation 
for filing these lawsuits was to line his pockets and those of his attorney). 
 95. See, e.g., Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 
1214–15 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (stating that the plaintiff in the case had “filed many 
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alleged motives of obtaining monetary damages or attorney’s 
fees instead of increasing accessibility.96 Some courts 
specifically state their doubt in plaintiffs’ pure intentions while 
others merely allude to bad motives.97 
E. Who Benefits from Repeat Filing? 
“Drive-by” lawsuits brought solely to recover attorney’s fees 
or statutory damages undoubtedly harm business and business 
owners—but who reaps the benefits?98 Plaintiffs filing in states 
that grant monetary awards certainly benefit from collecting 
damages. Even when states do not allow for monetary awards, 
observers express speculation of plaintiff-attorney “schemes,” 
alleging that the relationship may be financially beneficial for 
the plaintiff once the attorney has recovered for fees and costs.99 
 
Title III lawsuits—indeed, more than he can remember,” and comparing this 
to the pattern of vexatious plaintiffs in similar lawsuits); Doran v. Del Taco, 
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (asserting that the ADA has 
been distorted to generate attorney’s fees and given rise to “a cottage 
industry”); Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 
2004) (including a section in the opinion entitled “A Cottage Industry is Born,” 
asserting that the ADA has become a scheme to recover attorney’s fees instead 
of a way to promote accessibility). 
 96. See, e.g., Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Serial plaintiffs, like Molski, serve as ‘professional pawns in 
an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney’s fees.’ It is a ‘type of shotgun litigation 
[that] undermines both the spirit and purpose of the ADA.’”). 
 97. Compare Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (declaring the plaintiff a “vexatious litigant” and requiring 
him to obtain leave of court before filing any further ADA claims in the 
district); with Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004) (detailing plaintiff’s financial situation of being unemployed and 
supporting his family on social security and food stamps while also frequently 
traveling throughout Florida, which has resulted in at least fifty-four 
accessibility lawsuits, and questioning routes plaintiff took in his travels). 
 98. See Amy Kjose Anderson, Drive-By Lawsuits and the Abuse of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Jan. 24, 
2017), https://www.alec.org/article/drive-by-lawsuits-and-the-abuse-of-the-
americans-with-disabilities-act/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (describing how 
“drive-by” lawsuits harm businesses and business owners) [https://perma.cc
/2ZQD-QW3V].  
 99. See Olson, supra note 11 (referencing the common “cozy 
relationships” between complainants and their counsel engaged in serial ADA 
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Although unscrupulous plaintiffs may benefit financially, 
litigation should ultimately bring about accessibility, 
benefitting all disabled Americans.100 Accessibility non-profits 
that are engaged in repeat litigation state that lawsuits are the 
only way achieve this goal.101 Bob Cohen, head of Access for the 
Disabled, a non-profit in Florida, expressed his frustration:  
The properties ignore the law. They are aware of it, but they 
do nothing until a lawsuit is brought up. We tried for five 
years nothing but letters and personal phone contacts with 
restaurants and hotels, and we get no place . . . . We got 
extremely frustrated with the lack of cooperation.102 
On the other hand, some established activists and groups 
disagree.103 Individual activists and disability organizations 
have expressed their disdain for the “ADA shakedown 
racket.”104 One disability advocate noted that “you catch more 
flies with honey than vinegar” when discussing his advocacy 
philosophy.105 He focuses on positive advocacy methods like 
educating communities and consulting with business owners on 
accessibility.106 Activists have formed organizations and 
consulting businesses to encourage private facility owners to 
engage in voluntary compliance, convincing businesses that 
 
litigation and noting that several prominent ADA attorneys bring numerous 
suits on behalf of disabled family members). 
 100. See Anderson, supra note 98 (“Lawsuits aiming to bring about 
compliance with an important equal rights law like the ADA are important in 
advancing the cause, but some of the serial litigators are doing more to rake 
in damages than increase accessibility.”). 
 101. See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (quoting disability advocates 
explaining that letters and personal phone calls did not have any effect of 
accessibility enforcement). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See infra notes 104–108 (explaining the views expressed by these 
activist groups).  
 104. See Olson, supra note 11 (quoting one veteran activist saying he was 
appalled by the “grind-’em-out restaurant lawsuits”). 
 105. Matthew Shapiro, 6 Wheels Consulting Disability Podcast—Episode 
18 (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.6wheelsconsulting.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/36E9-XUUU]. 
 106. See id. (“I usually try to go the education route.”).  
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being accessible to all consumers is beneficial for their business 
model and the entire community.107 “Nearly all the established 
activist groups say they try to work with business owners to fix 
violations before running off to court. Many are emphatic that 
they view litigation as a last resort.”108 
1. Repeat Plaintiffs’ Response to Criticism 
Repeat filers continue to emphasize that lawsuits are 
necessary to force reluctant business owners to meet 
accommodation standards of the ADA.109 Thomas B. Bacon, who 
has represented plaintiffs in more than 300 disabled-access 
cases, notes that the only people who enforce the ADA are the 
few repeat plaintiffs and their attorneys.110 This is true. 
Congress intended for the ADA to be enforced through private 
citizens initiating litigation.111  
Although the U.S. Government occasionally files suit 
against noncompliant business owners, the ADA was designed 
to empower private citizens to bring claims.112 Congress 
authorized courts to award attorney’s fees in order to incentivize 
private attorneys to represent disabled individuals in Title III 
lawsuits.113 Private suits brought by members of the public 
 
 107. See id. (discussing Matthew Shapiro’s business, “6 Wheels 
Consulting, LLC,” and “Access Mob” in Pittsburgh, PA). 
 108. Olson, supra note 11; see also Shapiro, supra note 105 (describing 
activists’ use of positive reinforcement by explaining to businesses that 
promoting accessibility enhances their clientele). 
 109. See Lean, supra note 29 (making the comparison of lawsuits for 
disability discrimination to racial discrimination and noting that the public 
would not object to filings of the former). 
 110. See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12. (“‘The only people who enforce 
the ADA are these few plaintiffs and their attorneys,’ said Thomas B. Bacon, 
a Cooper City attorney who has represented plaintiffs in more than 300 
disabled-access cases.”). 
 111. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the 
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens). 
 112. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the limited 
remedies under the ADA and the need for private citizens to bring suits in 
order to enforce ADA compliance).  
 113. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.505 (2015) (allowing the prevailing party to recover 
a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs).  
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relieve the burden on the Department of Justice from inspecting 
every business that could potentially be committing an ADA 
violation.114 Private suits are the primary tool used to enforce 
the ADA due to the minimal role played by the Attorney General 
115  
Alternatively, private litigation may no longer be an 
effective method of enforcement.116 Many cases settle before 
making it to court because most businesses opt to mediate 
“when faced with costly litigation and a potentially drastic 
judgment against them.”117 Abusive plaintiffs use the threat of 
lawsuits and money damages as an effective inducement to 
settle quickly.118 Owners often see the choice to settle as a 
 
 114. See Helia Garrido Hull, Vexatious Litigants and the ADA:  Strategies 
to Fairly Address the Need to Improve Access for Individuals with Disabilities, 
26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 77–78 (2016) (“Recognizing the inability of 
the U.S. government to adequately address the myriad of accessibility 
violations that may emerge throughout the country, Congress also encouraged 
private enforcement under Title III.”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA 
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (noting the Department of Justice has 
devoted a small amount of lawyers to disability rights enforcement and those 
lawyers are responsible for enforcing the ADA against state and local 
governments as well as private entities).  
 115. See Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another 
Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 108–13 (2004) (noting that the DOJ’s Disability 
Rights Section only has “a small cadre of lawyers to bring actions and enforce” 
multiple sections of the ADA and initiated fewer cases in 2002 than 2001). 
 116. See infra notes 117–127 (explaining why private litigation may no 
longer be an effective method of enforcement). 
 117. See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (vacated on grounds of denial of attorney’s fees); see also Denise 
Johnson, Why Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act are Rising, 
INS. J. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016
/10/07/428774.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (explaining how claims are 
rising because, in part, lawyers are finding it a lucrative practice) [https://
perma.cc/XA9T-THFH]. 
 118. See Wilson v. Kayo Oil Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1071 (S.D. Cal. 
2007) (reinforcing that the ADA could be used for the illegitimate purpose of 
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business decision.119 Mediation is highly incentivized since it 
may cost three times more to file a motion to dismiss than to 
settle the suit out of court.120 Technical violations of the ADA 
are easy to prove and plaintiffs usually win.121 An unsuccessful 
defense could render a business owner liable for paying two sets 
of attorneys in addition to the damage costs imposed by a 
court.122 In Florida, some sources place the average settlements 
at $16,000, “while the cost of fighting the case can easily land in 
the hundreds of thousands of dollars.”123 One California bar 
owner decided to fight an ADA lawsuit and had to declare 
bankruptcy after he was ordered to pay $145,000 to compensate 
his opponent’s lawyers.124 Although anecdotal evidence points to 
 
 119. See Johnson, supra note 117 (explaining that mediation is much 
cheaper than going to court). 
 120. See, e.g., O’Campo v. Ghoman, No. 2:08-cv-1624, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120027, at *27 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (awarding plaintiff $12,000 in 
statutory damages and awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys $86,000 in fees and 
costs, all at cost to the defendant business owner); Moore v. Millennium 
Acquisitions, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01401-DAD-SAB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40722, *29 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (awarding the plaintiff $65,928.03 in 
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses); Fortson v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. CV 
11-01454 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62496, *31 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) 
(awarding plaintiff $155,944.27 in attorney’s fees and costs); see also Johnson, 
supra note 117 (explaining how lawyers are finding ADA suits lucrative). 
 121. See George King, ADA Violations: What to Do If You Are Sued, LANG 
& KLAIN (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.lang-klain.com/blog/ada-lawsuits (last 
visited on Apr. 8, 2020) (“Typically, the property owner is sued for technical 
violations of ADA standards for handicapped parking signs. These signs were 
often compliant when installed, but are now non-compliant because the 
standards were changed in 2010.”) [https://perma.cc/DS9T-ULMP]; Mark 
Pulliam, The ADA Litigation Monster, CITY J. (Spring 2017), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/ada-litigation-monster-15128.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2020) 
(“[P]laintiffs can recover their ‘costs’ and ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’ if they 
prevail (and merely proving technical noncompliance is sufficient to win).”) 
[https://perma.cc/X9QU-9Z5D]. 
 122. See Hull, supra note 114 (discussing the disincentive for attorneys to 
settle for corrective action instead of money and the incentive for businesses 
to settle rather than risk litigation).  
 123. Evan Gibbs, Stopping Drive-By Lawsuits, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/10/stopping-drive-by-lawsuits (last 
visited on Mar. 25, 2020) [https://perma.cc/EJ3E-V2KR]. 
 124. See Olson, supra note 11 (“River City Brewing, a popular downtown 
Sacramento bar, decided to fight an ADA lawsuit and eventually had to 
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an average settlement of $45,000 in California, this high 
average pales in comparison to cases where defendant business 
owners have fought the claims in court.125 Plaintiffs in 
California lawsuits have been awarded upwards of $155,000 in 
attorney’s fees and costs, which does not account for the 
attorney’s fees and litigation costs incurred by the business 
owner’s counsel.126 As a result, cases end in hasty payouts that 
fail to correct the violations they are supposed to address.127 
Plaintiffs who file suit with the goal of settling are not 
furthering the ADA’s mission of compliance.128 There is little, if 
any, enforcement of compliance once a settlement has been 
reached.129 Even though filing a lawsuit and ultimately 
reaching a settlement may draw attention to the 
noncompliance, it does little to remedy the barrier for future 
 
declare bankruptcy, after a court ordered it to pay $145,000 to compensate the 
disabled complainant’s lawyers.”). 
 125. See Hull, supra note 114 (“One California lawyer who specializes in 
disability-access suits said the average settlement for ADA lawsuits in 
California was $45,000 in 2013.”). 
 126. See Fortson v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. CV 11-01454 LB, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62496, at *31 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) (awarding plaintiff 
$155,944.27 in attorney’s fees and costs). 
 127. See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (explaining the negative effects 
of the rise of ADA litigation); see also O’Campo v. Ghoman, No. 2:08-cv-1624, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120027, at *23 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (“Much of the 
difference between this action and routine ADA cases that proceed to a motion 
for default judgment can be explained by the fact that the defendants in this 
action initially appeared and defended, forcing plaintiff’s counsel to expend 
time conducting discovery, conferring with defense counsel, etc.”). 
 128. See Leslie Lee, Giving Disabled Testers Access to Federal Courts: Why 
Standing Doctrine Is Not the Right Solution to Abusive ADA Litigation, 19 VA. 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L 319, 343 (showing why settling does not further the goal of 
the ADA). 
 129. See id. (“When an ADA lawsuit ends in settlement, monetary awards 
are paid directly to plaintiffs and their attorneys, and not expended on 
removing barriers to access.”); see also ADA Notification Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 106 
Cong. 49 (2000) (quoting Representative Charles Canady as stating, “The lure 
of large attorney’s fees is so great that attorneys may even settle cases for 
attractive sums for themselves by agreeing to terms by which a property would 
not even be fully accessible under the requirements of the ADA.”).  
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disabled customers.130 Currently, “there is no effective means to 
[e]nsure that these private actions actually result in changes 
that provide increased access to individuals with disabilities.”131 
One code enforcement officer in Florida stated that claimants do 
not care whether the violation is fixed once a business pays a 
settlement and the lawsuit disappears.132 Courts have alleged 
that “a plaintiff files suit, extracts a cash settlement, and loses 
all interest in the defendant’s future compliance with the 
ADA.”133 One restaurant owner in Florida stated that he agreed 
to pay more than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in 
settlement, but did not have enough money to fix the violations 
of his establishment after the payout.134 He stated that so far, 
no one has come back to check.135  
Business owners assert they would voluntarily spend the 
money to come into compliance if they were aware of the 
violations, but advocates disagree.136 Leaders in the disability 
law community of Florida assert that letter-writing campaigns 
 
 130. See Bagenstos, supra note 114, at 33 (arguing that the mere filing of 
a settlement would alert other potential plaintiffs, giving the business “every 
incentive to make its premises accessible”). 
 131. Hull, supra note 114.  
 132. See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (quoting a Delray Beach code 
enforcement officer stating that businesses “pay between $5,000 and $12,000 
and it goes away . . . . People are taking complete advantage. It’s a 
moneymaker. It has nothing to do with compliance.”). 
 133. See Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 
(S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that because the plaintiff is focused on a short-term 
reward, the ADA lawsuit provides little, if any, long-term assistance to 
disabled persons generally); see also Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. 
Supp. 2d 860, 866 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (questioning the plaintiff’s good faith and 
intention of actually litigating the suit on the merits and asserting that 
“Molski’s m.o. is clear: sue, settle, and move on to the next suit.”).  
 134. See Shipley & Maines, supra note 12 (“One Palm Beach restaurant 
owner confided to the Sun Sentinel that he agreed in a settlement to pay more 
than $12,000 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, but didn’t have enough cash after 
forking over those costs to fix all of the violations in his establishment.”). 
 135. See id. (“So far, he said, nobody’s come back to check [if he fixed the 
violations.”). 
 136. See supra Part II.E (discussing advocates’ assertions that businesses 
do not come into compliance without lawsuits). 
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and personal phone calls do not work.137 Established activist 
groups say they try to work with business owners to fix 
violations before filing suit, but businesses only come into 
compliance when faced with litigation.138 Advocates point out 
that businesses have had since 1990 to learn the standards set 
forth in the ADA.139 
It has therefore become clear that while some litigants may 
be fighting for compliance among business owners, this may not 
be not the case for all.140 Courts discuss the tactics of insincere 
plaintiffs whose goals are to win monetary damages instead of 
compliance.141 Some repeat plaintiffs are well known in their 
respected districts as serial filers who “target small businesses 
that default or settle.”142  
 
 137. See supra Part II.E (illustrating attempts and varied methodology to 
encourage businesses to comply with the ADA). 
 138. Olson, supra note 11 (suggesting litigation is the only method to drive 
businesses toward compliance). 
 139. See id. (noting advocates’ opposition to proposed notification 
requirements since it would provide a safe-harbor period, which businesses 
had when the ADA was enacted). 
 140. See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a 
case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a 
money settlement from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the 
ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”). 
 141. See Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004) (noting that the same plaintiffs filed “hundreds of lawsuits against 
establishments they purportedly visit regularly” and this type of “shotgun 
litigation undermines both the spirit and the purpose of the ADA.”); see also 
Young v. Mahasager, No. 03-6443 (MJD/JGL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48896, 
at *9–10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2005) (recognizing the plaintiff’s disingenuous 
motive evidenced by the plaintiff’s thirteen pending suits against hotels in the 
same area and expressing skepticism that plaintiff was genuine in his desire 
to return to all thirteen hotels). 
 142. See Cankat v. 41st Ave. Rest. Corp., No. 15 CV 4963 (SJ) (MDG), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171406, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (referencing the 
forty-three ADA cases in the same district with nearly identical claims and 
that future filings by serial filers should be strictly scrutinized); Molski v. 
Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that 
while plaintiff had filed hundreds of identical suits, not one had been litigated 
on the merits). 
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It is difficult to combat abusive litigation when some 
plaintiffs are working toward a more accessible United States 
while others use the law for personal gain. One serial litigant 
who filed at least 500 ADA lawsuits in California considered 
expanding his operations to Las Vegas.143 He ultimately decided 
against expanding, since Nevada “‘does not have damage 
provisions’ for access violations.”144 In the past, this plaintiff has 
informed the businesses he has sued “that they can settle out of 
court for $10,700 or so,” compared to the hundreds of thousands 
they might incur in a lengthy court battle.145  
Under the ADA, plaintiffs’ damages are limited to 
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.146 Therefore, notifying 
businesses of their non-compliance and achieving voluntary 
compliance may be a more rational solution for the good-faith 
plaintiff.147 Courts argue that rational plaintiffs who are 
genuinely working for accessibility would inform the business of 
their violations instead of immediately filing suit.148 Courts 
have noted, however, that vexatious litigation is additionally 
beneficial to attorneys specializing in ADA litigation.149 
 
 143. See Olson, supra note 11 (describing a man who “has filed at least 500 
lawsuits against a wide variety of firms—from Sears, Blockbuster Video, and 
McDonald’s to small mom-and-pop proprietorships”).  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying discussion (outlining the 
remedies for private plaintiffs as injunctive relief remedying the violation and 
attorney’s fees and costs). 
 147. See Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281–82 (M.D. 
Fla. 2004) (arguing that plaintiffs irrationally rush to file suit because pre-suit 
settlements do not vest plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s 
fees and “the current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially driven by 
economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees”). 
 148. See id. at 1281 (noting that “conciliation and voluntary compliance” 
would be “a more rational solution” than “rush[ing] to file suit”).  
 149. See id. at 1281–82 (noting that “pre-suit settlements do not vest 
plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees”).  
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2. Attorneys Benefitting from Vexatious Litigation 
Countless courts have chastised abusive litigants’ counsel 
for turning the ADA into “a fee-generating mill for [] lawyers to 
exploit the statutory scheme to see how many billable hours 
they [can] cram into a case.”150 “Courts throughout the country 
have raised concerns about this type of serial ADA litigation to 
take advantage of the statute’s attorney’s fees provision.”151 
When considering why a plaintiff would not attempt to engage 
the business owner in voluntary compliance, one court stated:  
Why would an individual like Plaintiff be in such a rush to 
file suit when only injunctive relief is available? Wouldn’t 
conciliation and voluntary compliance be a more rational 
solution? Of course it would, but pre-suit settlements do not 
vest plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees. 
Moreover, if a plaintiff forbears and attempts pre-litigation 
resolution, someone else may come along and sue first. The 
current ADA lawsuit binge is, therefore, essentially driven 
by economics—that is, the economics of attorney’s fees.152 
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fee-shifting 
statutes, practitioners who rely on statutory attorney’s fees will 
typically earn lower hourly rates than their counterparts with 
fee-paying clients.153 Statutory attorney’s fees are calculated by 
the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended, 
multiplied by a “reasonable hourly rate” for counsel’s services.154 
Some attorneys may take advantage of the fees provision by 
 
 150. See Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that these lawyers do a disservice to the disabled and 
the lawyers who carry out their duties under the ADA with professionalism). 
 151. See Shariff v. Beach 90th St. Realty Corp., No. 11 CV 2551 
(ENV)(LB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180185, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2013); see 
also Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *8 (“Courts across the country have long recognized the 
‘cottage industry’ of ADA lawyers who bring a large number of ADA suits to 
extract attorney’s fees, which is authorized under the ADA.”). 
 152. Rodriguez, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1281–82. 
 153. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 602 (2010) (explaining the lodestar 
method of calculating fees).  
 154. See id. (explaining the lodestar method of calculating fees). 
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attempting to recover for outlandish fees.155 Courts have 
frequently pointed to attorneys’ use of identical complaints and 
attempting to recover fees and costs for redundant work.156 
III. Attempted Solutions 
Opponents of abusive ADA litigation have attempted in 
various ways to eradicate abuse. Judges have exercised their 
discretion to curb abusive litigants, and both state and federal 
legislatures have attempted to pass legislation targeted at 
limiting abuse.157 Although there is no empirical data for how 
successful these attempts have been, this Note analyzes these 
efforts in order to understand what may be the most effective 
solutions to implement in the future. 
A. Judicial Discretion 
1. Limiting Attorney’s Fees 
Judges have the narrow discretion to reduce attorney’s fees 
in cases of vexatious litigation.158 Courts have stated that when 
 
 155. See, e.g., Shariff, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180185, at *16–18 
(discussing the “unwarranted” attorney’s fees sought by plaintiff).  
 156. See id. (noting the growing concern for the “cottage industry” of using 
ADA litigation to recover attorney’s fees and the plaintiff’s similar seventeen 
cases in the same district alone using the same “boilerplate language” for all 
claims, therefore reducing the attorney’s award of fees); Access 4 All, Inc. v. 
Grandview Hotel Ltd. P’ship, No. CV 04-4368 (TCP) (MLO), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15603, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (stating that the plaintiffs and 
their attorneys had pursued dozens of Title III actions against hotels in the 
area and because the cases involved “identical legal issues and similar factual 
issues,” the duplicitous nature of the litigation warranted a reduction in the 
law firm’s award).  
 157. See, e.g., Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. 
Haw. 2000) (outlining in great detail the numerous district court cases in 
which ADA claimants failed to show immediate threat of injury); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017) (stating that, under Arizona’s version of the ADA, 
a plaintiff cannot file suit until she has notified the business of a violation then 
given the business thirty days to remedy the issue).  
 158. See cases cited supra note 156 (discussing cases in which a judge 
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attorneys file virtually identical “cookie-cutter” Title III 
complaints, they should be able to litigate similar cases in an 
efficient and formulaic manner.159 In such cases, attorneys 
cannot request unnecessary expenses, and courts have limited 
their recovery accordingly.160  
Courts assign attorney’s fees by calculating (1) the 
reasonable number of hours expended, and (2) the reasonable 
hourly rate for each participating attorney; however, courts may 
also consider extraneous factors to determine whether to adjust 
this figure accordingly.161 Repeat litigants often file identical 
“boilerplate complaints” for their suits, which a court may 
decide warrants a downward adjustment.162 A court may also 
adjust attorney’s fees downward when “the majority of the law 
in each motion is identical, thus rendering much of the legal 
research largely unnecessary.”163 Several courts have taken this 
 
 159. See Brother v. Miami Hotels Invs., Ltd., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236–
38 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that many of the plaintiff’s attorney’s hours were 
“redundant or of such an assembly-line nature based on the similarity of the 
tasks . . . to the many other cases filed by counsel” and could have easily been 
“spit out by a word processing program”). 
 160. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (giving courts the 
power to adjust attorney’s fees “upward or downward” accordingly); see also 
Brother, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1236–38 (reducing the plaintiff’s attorney’s hours 
reasonably expended from 76.1 to 33, 51.3 to 25, and 20 to 25 to 12 due to the 
duplicitous nature of the “boilerplate” complaints identical to previous ones 
filed by the attorneys); Kennedy v. Spiegel, No. 15-81621-CV-Rosenberg
/Hopkins, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163155, at *7–9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2016) 
(noting that plaintiff’s attorney had represented plaintiff in at least seventy-
five other ADA cases in the same district and reducing the attorney’s hourly 
rate from the requested $420 to $300 and his hours expended from 37.3 to 27.3 
due to the duplicitous nature of the suit). 
 161. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (stating twelve factors to be considered in whether to adjust the 
lodestar calculation upward or downward); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 
526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting the twelve Johnson factors for the 
Ninth Circuit). 
 162. See Gilmore v. Elmwood S., LLC, No. 6:11-md-2299, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33584, at *12–15 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2015) (noting that the lawyers 
would essentially “cut-and-paste” complaints, diminishing the lawyers’ claim 
of time and labor required and need for legal research). 
 163. Id.  
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approach, whether their intent is to discourage repeat litigants 
or simply reduce attorney’s fees to a reasonable amount.164 
2. Imposing More Strenuous Standing Requirements                
on Plaintiffs 
Additionally, courts may dismiss a complaint for a 
plaintiff’s lack of standing.165 To satisfy Article III’s standing 
requirements, a plaintiff must satisfy three factors.166 First, a 
plaintiff must show she has suffered an injury in fact that is 
 
 164. See Langer v. San Pedro St. Props., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-08780-
ODW(AFM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191511, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2018) 
(reducing $6,035.50 in fees to $600 after considering that the attorney had 
filed over 600 cases in the central district of California with nearly identical 
complaints and subsequent filings); Love v. Gutierrez, No. CV 18-0872 DSF 
KS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186716, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2018) (reducing 
the attorneys’ time spent by fifty percent after considering “his repeated 
representation of Plaintiff in countless nearly identical ADA cases before this 
Court”); Vogel v. Dolanotto, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-02488-ODW-KSx, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 58442, at *12–17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2018) (reducing attorneys’ 
requested fees from $32,211.25 to $6,425.88 because plaintiff and his attorney 
had filed at least 622 ADA cases in the central district of California and the 
attorneys had litigated ADA claims on behalf of Martin Vogel “in hundreds, if 
not thousands, of cases”); Kennedy v. Satya Grp., LLC, No. 2:17-CV-14393-
ROSENBERG/MAYNARD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1667, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 3, 2018) (reducing attorney’s fees because plaintiff’s counsel had filed 
multiple identical complaints on the same plaintiff’s behalf); Houston v. South 
Bay Investors #101, LLC, No. 13-80193-CV-HURLEY/HOPKINS, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 104281, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2013) (reducing attorney’s fees 
by thirty-five percent due to the identical complaints submitted by counsel for 
the same plaintiff); Access for the Disabled, Inc. v. Mo. Mart, Inc., No. 8:05-cv-
392-T-23MSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101125, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2006) 
(reducing attorney’s fees and considering the eight other identical cases filed 
by plaintiff on the same day, also noting that plaintiffs filed a complaint nearly 
identical, including typos, in another case); Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. 
Taylor Inn Enters., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967–68 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting 
that the law firm was counsel of record in at least forty-one ADA cases in the 
same district and of those, thirty were brought by the same plaintiffs and with 
boilerplate complaints, resulting in a reduced fee). 
 165. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding 
that plaintiffs lacked standing and thus the Court of Appeals had erred in 
failing to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment).  
 166. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing the factors detailed in Lujan).  
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concrete and particularized and actual or imminent.167 Second, 
the injury must be traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant.168 Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.169  
Many ADA claims have been dismissed for a lack of 
standing when the plaintiff has failed to show a real or 
immediate threat of injury.170 For example, if a plaintiff states 
that she may “someday” return to the noncompliant 
establishment, she has only alleged a speculative injury (as 
opposed to a “real and immediate” injury).171 Courts have 
considered a multitude of factors when determining the validity 
of a plaintiff’s injury including (1) plaintiff’s personal history of 
use of the facility, (2) whether the plaintiff can demonstrate that 
she would need to utilize the facility in the future, (3) the 
distance between the plaintiff’s home and the defendant facility, 
(4) if the alleged barriers are related to plaintiff’s respective 
disabilities, and (5) whether the plaintiff actually experienced a 
barrier or merely observed one from afar.172 A plaintiff’s 
 
 167. Id. at 180.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 181.  
 170. See Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. Haw. 
2000) (outlining in great detail the numerous district court cases which have 
denied standing for claims for lack of immediate threat of injury). 
 171. See id. at 1299 (determining that standing did not exist when plaintiff 
stated that she would “look into” another trip on defendant cruise line). 
 172. See Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 
1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that a personal history of use of a facility and 
continued residence in the area supported plaintiff’s contention that he would 
likely patronize the facility in the future); Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. 
Supp. 2d 1065, 1079–80 (D. Haw. 2000) (considering the reasonable distance 
between the franchise and plaintiff’s residence to establish standing); but see 
Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1368–69 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(determining that that the plaintiff did not have standing because he merely 
observed the barriers at a hotel and did not stay the night therefore he did not 
suffer an “injury in fact”); Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that plaintiffs cannot seek relief for all ADA violations, including 
those unrelated to his disability); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 320 (E.D. 
Va. 1995) (determining that standing did not exist when the plaintiff moved 
to a different state from the discriminating establishment); Aikins v. St. 
Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1333–34 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that 
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litigious history may also be weighed to determine standing.173 
This discretion is more powerful in cases when plaintiffs have 
filed numerous identical suits.174 
This attempt to deter vexatious claims, however, may not 
be a long-term fix. One court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment for a lack of standing, stating that “in view 
of his extensive litigation history, [Plaintiff’s] professed intent 
to return to the property is insufficient.”175 The court then 
highlighted that “if history is any guide, then [Counsel] and his 
clients will adjust to this ruling so that their future filings 
satisfy Article III’s standing requirements.”176 
One court used plaintiffs’ lack of standing to dismiss 
approximately 1,700 lawsuits filed by a disability-rights 
organization, Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities.177 
Judge Talamante granted the Attorney General of Arizona’s 
motion to dismiss the organization’s accessibility cases in 2017, 
which was followed by a settlement between AID and the 
Attorney General permanently barring the group “from filing 
frivolous disability lawsuits against Arizona businesses.”178 The 
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss alleged a lack of standing 
for the following reasons:  (1) plaintiffs failed to allege that they 
 
standing did not exist when the plaintiff could not show that she would need 
to use the facility again). 
 173. See Brother v. CPL Invs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (“In light of his extensive litigation, the fact that he never stayed at the 
hotel, and his testimony about why he did not keep a subsequent reservation, 
the Court does not credit Mr. Brother’s allegation that he intended to 
patronize the hotel.”) (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. at 1369 (observing that the plaintiff had filed more than fifty 
other identical ADA suits in Florida in the last year). 
 175. Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 
2004). 
 176. Id.  
 177. See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, Serial 
Litigant Permanently Enjoined from Filing Frivolous ADA Lawsuits Against 
AZ Businesses (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/serial-
litigant-permanently-enjoined-filing-frivolous-ada-lawsuits-against-az (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2020) (outlining the judge’s granting of the Attorney General’s 
motion to dismiss and the concessions made by the advocacy group) [ https://
perma.cc/Y2ZM-P5S6]. 
 178. Id. 
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patronized the businesses they sued, (2) plaintiffs failed to 
allege an actual barrier to their access, (3) plaintiffs failed to 
sufficiently allege denial of access based upon their particular 
identified disability, (4) Arizona does not recognize a 
“deterrence” theory of standing, and (5) plaintiffs failed to 
provide prior notice or an opportunity to remedy alleged 
violations, which is an additional standing requirement for 
injunctive relief.179 The ensuing settlement led to AID, their 
affiliates, and successors being permanently enjoined from 
filing any new actions in Arizona state courts under either the 
ADA or the Arizonans with Disabilities Act, agreeing to have 
judgment entered against them for reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs in each case in which they were a party, and paying 
$25,000 to the Arizona Attorney General’s Office to be used to 
educate businesses regarding ADA compliance.180 This extreme 
measure of barring a disability-rights organization from 
bringing suit was seen as a “victory for Arizona consumers and 
small businesses.”181 This was not, however, a victory for 
disabled consumers. 
In addition to heightened standing requirements, some 
courts have used their jurisdictional power to deter the recovery 
of monetary damages. In Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston,182 the 
court refused to allow the plaintiff to pursue state money 
damages through the court’s federal jurisdiction, citing 
Congress’s conscious decision to not permit money damages 
 
 179. See Kathryn Palamountain, Arizona Attorney General Secures 
Dismissal of 1,700 Lawsuits By Serial Plaintiffs, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Feb. 
28, 2017), https://www.adatitleiii.com/2017/02/arizona-attorney-general-
secures-dismissal-of-1700-lawsuits-by-serial-plaintiffs/ (last visited Mar. 7, 
2020) (noting the lack of a written decision laying out the Court’s reasoning, 
so it is unclear which of the arguments persuaded the court to issue the 
decision) [https://perma.cc/GQ8M-JTZD].  
 180. See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, supra 
note 177 (describing the concessions made by AID which also included 
dropping their appeal of the order dismissing the cases). 
 181. Id. (quoting Attorney General Mark Brnovich). 
 182. See Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75154, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (refusing to grant 
supplemental jurisdiction to a plaintiff who sought to “misuse” the ADA).  
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through litigation under the ADA.183 The court accused 
plaintiffs of exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional hook to extract 
a money settlement from the restaurant.184 “Thus, the 
compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction as 
presented by this case is the prevention of the misuse and 
exploitation of the ADA in a way that directly contravenes 
congressional intent and the remedial nature of the ADA.”185 
3. Sanctioning Abusive Litigants and Their Counsel 
Courts have the discretion and authority to impose 
sanctions on litigants engaged in abusive litigation or attorneys 
who engage in the unethical practice of law.186 Judges may 
impose pre-filing requirements compelling a plaintiff or law 
firm to seek leave of court before filing additional ADA claims 
when such sanctions may be warranted by “ethical violations, 
attorney or plaintiff malfeasance, or the filing of 
non-meritorious claims.”187 Courts have begun to impose 
sanctions on serial plaintiffs more frequently in recent years. 
One such case, Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,188 the court 
declared the plaintiff a vexatious litigant and ordered that he 
and his counsel obtain leave of court before filing any more Title 
 
 183. See id. at *4 (alleging plaintiffs’ motive to pursue money damages as 
“sidestepping” the intent of the ADA in not creating a private right of action 
for compensatory damages). 
 184. See id. at *8 (“This is not a case to vindicate a disabled person’s rights; 
it is a case brought to extract a money settlement from a restaurant in 
Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s jurisdictional hook to achieve 
that goal.”).  
 185. Id. at *9. 
 186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018) (stating that persons who multiply 
proceedings “in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the 
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees 
reasonably incurred because of such conduct”). 
 187. Raetano v. Kally K’S, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-02104-T-17-TGW, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25088, at *24–25 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing Molski v. 
Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, 500 
F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008)).  
 188. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 
2007) (finding Molski’s history of factual allegations to be contrived and 
exaggerated, necessitating pre-filing review of future claims).  
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III claims.189 Molski was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and subsequently followed in district courts in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, respectively.190 One district court in New 
York, comparing counsel’s ADA litigation tactics to that of 
Molski, stated that the conduct of counsel would not be tolerated 
and “the Court [would] not be shy about informing the 
appropriate state bar authorities and chief judges across the 
country should [counsel] unadvisedly continue to litigate in this 
fashion.”191 Although courts often issue opinions speaking 
harshly about serial plaintiffs, they are likely reluctant to issue 
sanctions since repeat filing under the ADA is not illegal or 
unethical per se. 
B. Legislative Action 
Countless courts, legal scholars, businessmen, politicians, 
and even disability advocates have expressed the desire for a 
legislative solution to abusive ADA litigation. The Honorable 
Anne C. Conway has stated that “the system for adjudicating 
disputes under the ADA cries out for a legislative solution.”192 
She has argued that the means for enforcing the ADA—
attorney’s fees—have become more important than the end goal 
of accessibility, and only Congress can respond to vexatious 
litigation tactics.193 Individual businesses and business 
associations continue to lobby for state and federal 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Mayes v. PTP Invs., No. 13-5475 LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70369, at *13 (E.D. La. May 21, 2014) (citing Molski but determining that it 
was not controlling in the instant case); Segal v. Rickey’s Rest. & Lounge, Inc., 
No. 11-61766-CIV-MARRA/HOPKINS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379, at *19–
20 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2012) (same).  
 191. See Costello v. Flatman, LLC, No. 11-CV-287 (SJ)(VVP), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45860, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing United States v. 
Morales as evidence of the court’s willingness to sanction attorneys in the past) 
(citing United States v. Morales, No. 07 CR 460 (SJ),2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57924 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010)). 
 192. Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 
2004). 
 193. See id. (“Moreover, the means for enforcing the ADA (attorney’s fees) 
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legislation.194 For decades, the business community has 
demanded a notice-and-cure provision in accessibility 
legislation.195 Some elected officials agree. Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill standardizing damage awards for 
disability discrimination because he believed it did not go far 
enough.196 His veto message asserted he would “welcome 
legislation that would provide an avenue for businesses . . . to 
correct potential violations prior to being subjected to fines or 
civil liability.”197 Ultimately, many legislative solutions have 
been proposed on the state and federal level, with some bills 
being passed in state legislatures. 
 
 194. See Mary Johnson, Business Strikes Back:  California Firms Press 
State Bills to Stop Access Lawsuits, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE (May 2, 2005), http://
www.raggededgemagazine.com/focus/notifact0505.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2020) (noting that a proposed Senate bill implementing a four-month notice-
and-cure period was supported by the California Association of Independent 
Businesses, the California Chamber of Commerce, and the California Business 
Properties Association) [https://perma.cc/K4MS-4UWM]; see also Mike 
DeBonis, House Passes Changes to Americans With Disabilities Act Over 
Activists’ Objections, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/house-passes-changes-to-americans-
with-disabilities-act-over-activists-objections/2018/02/15/c812c9ea-125b-11e8-
9065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.2f9751c3fcbc (last visited Mar. 7, 
2020) (citing the International Council of Shopping Centers and the National 
Federation of Independent Businesses as supporting legislation to stop drive-
by lawsuits) [https://perma.cc/R5ED-W22K]. 
 195. See William Adams, California AB 1521 Now Law: Strongest Measure 
Yet to Curb ADA Abuse, ADA DEF. L. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://adadefense.net
/2016/01/07/california-curb-ada-abuse-ab-1521/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) 
(describing a recently passed California law condemning high-frequency 
litigants that failed to implement a notice-and-cure provision for businesses) 
[https://perma.cc/G87N-8K7L]. 
 196. See Kevin G. Baker, AB1707 Judiciary !!VETOED!! Disability Access 
Denial Penalty, CDR-LEGISLATIVE COMMENTS (Aug. 24, 2004), http://cdr-
leg.blogspot.com/2004/08/ab1707-judiciary-vetoed-disability.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2020) (stating that the Governor vetoed AB1707 and including the 
Governor’s veto message) [https://perma.cc/5WUH-M5A8]. 
 197. See id. (noting the hopeful public policy goal of ensuring facilities are 
open to persons with disabilities and not to penalize businesses financially for 
“unintended violations that can easily be corrected”). 
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1. State Legislation 
States with the most accessibility litigation face heightened 
pressure to pass legislation. Some have successfully enacted 
legislation aimed at deterring abusive litigants.198 Arizona’s 
legislature recently amended their state accessibility law to 
protect businesses from “drive-by lawsuits” following Attorney 
General Mark Brnovich’s intervention in 1,000 consolidated 
accessibility cases brought by one advocacy organization.199 The 
Phoenix-based advocacy group, Advocates for Individuals with 
Disabilities, argued that their “seven-month blitz” of lawsuits 
was the only effective method to enforce accessibility 
requirements on business owners.200 The Attorney General’s 
office disagreed and requested an expedited ruling, calling the 
lawsuits “a concerted effort to improperly use the judicial 
system for (AID’s) own enrichment.”201  
Following the legal battle, Arizona amended their state 
legislation to protect businesses from “drive-by lawsuits” under 
the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (AzDA).202 Under the new 
AzDA, an aggrieved party must provide the noncompliant 
 
 198. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017); CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 425.55(a)(2) (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 55.56(e) (2015). 
 199. See Caroline Larsen, Arizona Amends State Disabilities Act to Protect 
Businesses from Drive-by Lawsuits, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & 
STEWART, P.C. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://ogletree.com/insights/2017-04-20
/arizona-amends-state-disabilities-act-to-protect-businesses-from-drive-by-
lawsuits/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“Arizona Governor Doug Ducey just 
signed into law an amendment to the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (AzDA) 
designed to make it more difficult to bring lawsuits against businesses based 
on claims that they are not accessible to individuals with disabilities.”). 
[https://perma.cc/Z458-96D8]. 
 200. See Maria Polletta, Arizona Attorney General Intervenes in Flood of 
Lawsuits Over Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, ARIZ. 
CENT. (Aug. 24, 2016, 6:49 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local
/phoenix/2016/08/24/arizona-attorney-general-intervenes-flood-lawsuits-over-
compliance-americans-disabilities-act/89309208/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) 
(quoting Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities as stating that lawsuits 
were the “only effective method to wake up business owners” who continued 
to ignore federal accessibility requirements, particularly in parking lots) 
[https://perma.cc/HE3A-3ZTT]. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Larsen, supra note 199. 
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business with written notice of the violation and allow for thirty 
days to cure the violation or comply with the law.203 Only after 
satisfying the notice and waiting period can the aggrieved party 
file a civil action if the business has not cured the violation.204 If 
the private entity is required to obtain a building permit or 
government approval to make the changes, they must provide 
the aggrieved party with the corrective action they plan to 
pursue.205 The business is then allowed an additional sixty days 
to make the correction.206 The statute also contains a provision 
allowing any party to motion for the court to stay an action in 
order to determine whether the plaintiff or their attorney is a 
vexatious litigant.207 While plaintiffs are now required to 
provide notice before suing under the state law, these notice 
requirements have no effect on litigation under the ADA.208  
California, the leading state in accessibility litigation, has 
also attempted to curb abusive plaintiffs. Senate Bill 1186, 
enacted in 2012, requires an attorney to provide notice to “a 
building owner or tenant with each demand for money or 
complaint for any construction-related accessibility claim.”209 
The purpose is to provide the potential defendant with sufficient 
facts to identify the basis for the claim.210 Unlike Arizona, the 
law does not require a waiting period to allow the business in 
violation to cure the violation.211 The most recent version of 
California’s S.B. 1186, Assembly Bill 1521, extended S.B. 1186 
 
 203. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. § 41-1492.08(F). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. § 41-1492.08(I). 
 208. See, e.g., H.R. 3765., 114th Cong. (2015) (failing to implement a notice 
requirement under the ADA). 
 209. S.B. 1186, 2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).  
 210. See id. (“The bill would require an allegation of a construction-related 
accessibility claim in a demand letter or complaint to state facts sufficient to 
allow a reasonable person to identify the basis for the claim.”).  
 211. Compare id. (requiring pre-suit notice to defendants), with ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 41-1492.08(E) (2017) (requiring a thirty-day period between providing 
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to 2018 and created additional requirements for suits filed by 
high-frequency litigants.212 Now, serial plaintiffs must state 
“whether the complaint is filed by, or on behalf of, a 
high-frequency litigant, the number of complaints . . . filed 
during the 12 months prior to filing the complaint, and the 
reason why the individual visited the place of public 
accommodation.”213  
The California legislature also amended its California Code 
of Civil Procedure to define “high-frequency litigant.”214 The act 
of defining a “high-frequency litigant” in a state’s Code of Civil 
Procedure may seem innocuous, but the legislature drafted this 
definition to directly target accessibility claims: 
According to information from the California Commission on 
Disability Access, more than one-half, or 54 percent, of all 
construction-related accessibility complaints filed between 
2012 and 2014 were filed by two law firms. Forty-six of all 
complaints were filed by a total of 14 parties. Therefore, a 
very small number of plaintiffs have filed a 
disproportionately large number of construction-related 
accessibility claims in the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each 
year. Moreover, these lawsuits are frequently filed against 
small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints, 
apparently seeking quick cash settlements rather than the 
correction of the accessibility violation. This practice unfairly 
taints the reputation of other innocent disabled customers 
who are merely trying to go about their daily lives . . . .215 
While the new law condemning high-frequency litigants 
does not create a legal or procedural hurdle, “it is sure to play a 
role in judicial decisions.”216 The section defines a 
“high-frequency litigant” as a person “who utilizes court 
resources in actions arising from alleged construction-related 
access violations at such a high level that it is appropriate that 
 
 212. A.B. 1521, 2015 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
 213. Id. 
 214. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.55(a)(2) (2015). 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Adams, supra note 195 (noting the significance of this new code 
and that “[n]ever before has the same state law that created the incentive for 
high-frequency litigants also condemned their tactics”). 
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additional safeguards apply so as to ensure that the claims are 
warranted.”217 The statute does not say what additional 
safeguards judges should apply or how to apply them, but it 
significantly empowers judges to apply a higher level of scrutiny 
for high-frequency litigants of construction-related accessibility 
claims.218 The law provides a low threshold, specifying that a 
high-frequency litigant is a plaintiff who has filed ten or more 
complaints alleging an accessibility violation within a twelve-
month period or an attorney who has represented ten or more 
high-frequency litigant plaintiffs.219 In addition to empowering 
judges to apply additional safeguards, the law implements “a 
‘supplemental’ filing fee for high-frequency litigants of $1,000 
per lawsuit.”220 This may be in response to high-frequency 
litigants often controversially filing as “paupers” to avoid paying 
basic filing fees.221  
Florida, another hot bed of accessibility litigation, enacted 
House Bill 727 in response to the growing number of Title III 
cases filed in the state.222 House Bill 727 allows businesses to 
hire an accessibility expert to evaluate their premises for ADA 
compliance and subsequently file a certificate of conformity or a 
remediation plan with the Florida Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation.223 The law then requires courts to 
“consider any remediation plan or certificate of conformity” in 
actions alleging a Title III violation.224 The remediation plan or 
certification would be considered when the court “determines if 
 
 217. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.55(b) (2015). 
 218. See id. (noting that “additional safeguards” are appropriate to ensure 
that a high-frequency litigant’s “claims are warranted”).  
 219. Id. 
 220. Adams, supra note 195. 
 221. See id. (arguing that filing as “paupers” is controversial “since given 
the settlement amounts and volume, it would appear that high frequency 
litigants are involved in a very lucrative endeavor”). 
 222. See Gibbs, supra note 123 (describing Florida’s efforts to curb Title 
III lawsuits and arguing that federal legislation is necessary “to effectively 
curb serial filers and their attorneys”). 
 223. H.B. 727, 2017 Leg., 119th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).  
 224. Id. 
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the plaintiff’s complaint was filed in good faith and if the 
plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and costs.”225 
2. Attempted Federal Legislation 
Federal legislators have repeatedly introduced bills aimed 
at curbing private litigation under the ADA, to no avail. As one 
article notes  
[In 2013], two U.S. representatives from California 
introduced legislation with the goal of amending the [ADA] 
to impose notice and compliance opportunities for 
defendants before they are hit with lawsuits. But as was the 
case with more than a dozen similar pieces of legislation 
introduced since 2000 . . . the bills stalled.226  
The ADA Education and Reform Act of 2015 sought to 
amend the ADA and add a notice-and-cure period before 
commencing a private civil action to curb “unfair and deceptive 
acts.”227 The ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017 passed in 
the House in 2018 but failed in the Senate shortly thereafter.228 
Versions of the bill had been “introduced five times altogether 
over the last several years,” but this was the first time it had 
“reached the U.S. House floor.”229 Other bills, such as the 
Correcting Obstructions to Mediate, Prevent, and Limit 
Inaccessibility Act (114 H.R. 4719) and the ADA Notification 
Acts of 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013, have 
yet to make it past the introduction phase of the legislative 
process.230 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Shipley & Maines, supra note 12. 
 227. H.R. 3765, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015).  
 228. ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 620, 115th Cong. 
(2017).  
 229. See Dave Biscobing, Bill that Would Try and Stop Drive-by ADA 
Lawsuits Passes US House, ABC15.COM (Feb. 16, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://
www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/bill-that-would-try-and-stop-
drive-by-ada-lawsuits-passes-us-house (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (citing the 
bill’s author, Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas)) [https://perma.cc/D83E-ZFFL]. 
 230. H.R. 3590, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 914, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 
728, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2804, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3479, 110th 
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3. Potential Problems with Legislative Solutions 
Some individuals with disabilities, and even advocates, 
support adding a notice-and-cure requirement to the ADA.231 
Specifics of such requirements, though, are hotly debated.232 
How long should a notice-and-cure period last:  thirty days, sixty 
days, four months? What exactly should the “cure” be:  a written 
plan to improve accessibility, merely an attempt to resolve the 
inaccessibility, or completing construction to remove the 
barrier?233  
One failed piece of federal legislation, the “ADA Education 
and Reform Act of 2015,” proposed a sixty-day window for 
owners to identify the barrier and provide aggrieved individuals 
“a written description outlining improvements that will be made 
to remove the barrier.”234 The failed “Correcting Obstructions to 
Mediate, Prevent, and Limit Inaccessibility Act” proposed a 
notice-and-compliance opportunity of ninety days for an owner 
or operator to remove the barrier and correct the violation before 
 
Cong. (2007); H.R. 2397, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 881, 112th Cong. (2011); 
H.R. 777, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 231. See, e.g., Gordon, Rees, Scully, Mansukhani, LLP, California’s 
Legislation to Curb Abusive ADA Lawsuits (2012), https://www.grsm.com
/publications/2012/california-s-legislation-to-curb-abusive-ada-lawsuits (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“There is no right-to-cure language in the revised bill, 
but Disability Rights California advocacy director Margaret Johnson called for 
a 30-day notice requirement because the purported violations are ‘a 
substantial infringement on the civil rights of people with disabilities.’”) 
[https://perma.cc/7DC2-3DTQ].  
 232. See Heather Ansley, Jennifer Mathis, Vania Leveille, Myths and 
Truths About the “ADA Education and Reform Act” (H.R. 620), ACLU.ORG, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/myths_and_truths
_about_the_ada_education_and_reform_act_-_updated_2-13-18.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2020) (discussing the potential harm to individuals with 
disabilities when enforcing a notice-and-cure requirement) 
[https://perma.cc/F67B-YWR5]. 
 233. Id. (analyzing the difference between fixing a barrier and making 
“substantial progress” in removing a barrier); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S COMMENTS ON THE “ADA EDUCATION AND REFORM 
ACT OF 2017” (H.R. 620) (2017) (explaining the concerns of the Civil Rights 
Division, which administers and enforces the ADA, with substantial “cure” 
times delaying individuals’ rights to accommodations). 
 234. H.R. 3765., 114th Cong. (2015). 
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a civil action could be brought.235 Alternatively, if an owner of a 
noncompliant business demonstrated a “good faith effort” to 
remove the barrier but was not able to do so within ninety days, 
he or she would be entitled to an additional thirty days to 
comply with accessibility requirements.236  
Most recently, the failed “ADA Education and Reform Act 
of 2017,” also known commonly as H.R. 620, suggested a 
sixty-day period for the owner to provide the aggrieved person 
“with a written description outlining improvements that 
[would] be made to remove the barrier.”237 The owner would 
then be required to remove the barrier or “make substantial 
progress in removing the barrier” at the end of a 120-day period 
beginning on the date the owner received notice.238 Requiring a 
building owner to make “substantial progress” in fixing a 
barrier again raises concerns over the subjective nature of the 
“cure” part of “notice and cure” bills. What exactly is 
“substantial progress”? 
4. Advocates’ Response to Legislative “Fixes” 
The Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund 
(DREDF) outlined eight of the disability community’s main 
concerns with the recently proposed H.R. 620 and similar 
bills.239 First, DREDF noted that these types of bills remove 
incentives for businesses to become accessible and encourage 
businesses to not make changes until they receive “notice” from 
potential plaintiffs.240 Second, DREDF emphasized the 
discrimination that individuals with disabilities face every day 
 
 235. H.R. 4719., 114th Cong. (2016). 
 236. Id. 
 237. H.R. 620, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 238. Id. 
 239. See Overview of Concerns with H.R. 620, the ADA Education and 
Reform Act of 2017, and Similar Bills, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, 
https://dredf.org/hr620/overview-of-concerns-with-h-r-620/ (last visited Mar. 
8, 2020) (arguing that H.R. 620 and similar bills significantly weaken the 
impact of the ADA) [https://perma.cc/X9VL-JT5V]. 
 240. See id. (pointing out that today, businesses have an obligation to 
become accessible and H.R. 620 would remove these immediate consequences). 
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when they are not able to access public accommodations.241 
Third, DREDF noted that these bills place the heavy burden on 
individuals with disabilities to send a detailed written notice.242 
For example, H.R. 620 would require a person encountering an 
access barrier to “send a written notice specifying in detail the 
circumstances under which access was denied, including the 
property address, whether a request for assistance was made, 
and whether the barrier is permanent or temporary.”243 
Importantly, “no other civil rights law permits businesses to 
discriminate without consequence unless and until the victims 
of discrimination notify the business that it has violated the 
law.”244  
Fourth, DREDF pointed out that these bills would not fix 
business’s concerns of monetary damage awards since these 
have “nothing to do with the ADA.”245 The ADA does not permit 
recovery of monetary damages through private litigation; the 
only remedies are injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.246 
Statutes awarding plaintiffs monetary damages are state law 
and therefore not affected by federal legislation like H.R. 620.247 
Fifth, DREDF argued that courts already have the power “ to 
address the few unscrupulous attorneys” who may file frivolous 
 
 241. See id. (“The ADA is the difference between participation and 
exclusion on a daily basis. Why should a wheelchair user be unable to join her 
family at a restaurant, just because the owner has resisted installing a ramp 
for 28 years?”). 
 242. See id. (“H.R. 620 requires a person with a disability who encounters 
an access barrier to send a written notice specifying in detail the 
circumstances under which access was denied, including the property address, 
whether a request for assistance was made, and whether the barrier is 
permanent or temporary.”). 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. (noting that the ADA does not allow for money damages). 
 246. See id. (noting that supporters of the bill cite monetary damage 
awards as a concern regarding Title III litigation). 
 247. See id. (explaining that a congressional amendment to the ADA “will 
do nothing to prevent damage awards under state laws”). 
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lawsuits.248 DREDF acknowledges the growing concern over 
frivolous lawsuits, but argues the disability community should 
not be burdened in order for Congress to remedy the problem of 
abusive litigation.249 Advocates question why courts and state 
bar associations cannot sanction abusive litigation when they 
“already have extensive power to deal with any frivolous 
litigants or their attorneys.”250 They argue the “existing legal 
mechanisms” should be used to combat abusive litigation 
instead of “deny[ing] the civil rights established by the ADA.”251 
Sixth, DREDF noted that “[t]he ADA is already very 
carefully crafted to take the needs of business owners into 
account.”252 Seventh, it noted that there are already “extensive 
federal efforts to assist business compliance,” such as the “in-
depth DOJ ADA website [], the DOJ ADA hotline, extensive 
DOJ technical assistance materials, and the ten federally-
funded regional ADA Centers” that provide resources and 
training.253 Lastly, DREDF emphasized the importance of ADA 
standards as not merely “minor details or picky rules, but 
rather” essential accessibility standards to ensure access for all 
citizens, including individuals with disabilities.254 
IV. Recommendations 
Solving “abusive” ADA litigation is inherently challenging 
because repeat litigants are not doing anything illegal. This is 
how the ADA was designed to enforce accessibility. Filing a 
claim against an unassuming business owner for technical 
violations (like a disabled access sign being the improper size or 
 
 248. See id. (“For the rare few who may file fraudulent claims or engage in 
unscrupulous practices, state courts and state bar associations already have 
extensive power to deal with any frivolous litigants or their attorneys.”). 
 249. See id. (acknowledging “concerns about frivolous lawsuits or serial 
litigants” but arguing that these concerns should be addressed in a way that 
does not “deny the civil rights established by the ADA”).  
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
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a mirror being hung 1.5 inches too high) may seem unfair and 
feel intrinsically wrong, but the ADA does not contain provisions 
to protect against “frivolous suits” for what some may see as 
“minor technicalities.”255 Additionally, it can be difficult and 
dangerous to distinguish between “good” litigants and 
“vexatious” litigants. A technical violation may seem 
insignificant to most able-bodied individuals, but it could be a 
very real obstacle for someone who uses a wheelchair or is 
mobility impaired. How, then, can we separate and eliminate 
abusive litigation in order to protect businesses while also 
defending disabled individuals’ rights? There is no easy solution 
to satisfy all parties, but compromise may be manageable. A 
multi-tier approach engaging the various parties involved can 
be instituted through (1) judicial discretion, (2) mandatory court 
approval of settlements, (3) notice-and-cure legislation, and (4) 
lawyers’ tools of self-regulation. 
A. Empower Courts to Exercise Meaningful Judicial Discretion 
As demonstrated in the Introduction of this Note, courts do 
not shy away from chastising those they view as abusive 
litigants, but they have slowly begun to implement punishments 
for that perceived (or concrete) exploitation.256 Recently, one 
court went so far as to order the plaintiff and his attorney to 
return all fees and costs they had received back to the 
defendant.257 The court further enjoined the plaintiff and his 
 
 255. See Vicky Nguyen, Jeremy Carroll & Kevin Nious, California 
Outpaces Other States in ADA Lawsuits, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 19, 2014), 
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/California-Outpaces-Other-
States-in-ADA-Lawsuits-disability-act-246193931.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2020) (distinguishing claims of true embarrassment and inequality, e.g. a 
disabled individual having to use the restroom with the door open because her 
wheelchair could not fit in the stall, from “technical violations”) [ https://
perma.cc/3KT9-36X7]. 
 256. See Johnson v. Ocaris Mgmt. Group, No. 18-CV-24586-PCH, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144773, at *27–28 (S.D. Fla. Aug 23, 2019) (sanctioning the 
plaintiff’s attorney and ordering plaintiff to return all fees and costs back to 
the defendant). 
 257. See id. (“Johnson and Dindin shall disgorge all fees and costs 
recovered in each of the gas pump cases.”). 
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counsel from “filing any ADA complaint in any federal or state 
court in Florida or any court outside of Florida without first 
obtaining written permission” from the court.258 The attorney 
was then referred to the “Ad Hoc Committee on Attorney 
Admissions, Peer Review and Attorney Grievance for 
investigation of his actions.” A news article on the court’s 
decision quoted a local municipal attorney as saying: “Oh, he is 
in deep trouble,” and that the attorney in the case “is personally 
looking at potential disbarment.”259 
While such sanctions may curb abusive litigants, the Ninth 
Circuit issued a rightful warning to courts taking this kind of 
action.260 Because the ADA is designed to be enforced by private 
litigation and does not allow for damages,  
most ADA suits are brought by a small number of private 
plaintiffs who view themselves as champions of the disabled. 
District courts should not condemn such serial litigation as 
vexatious as a matter of course. For the ADA to yield its 
promise of equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be 
necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring 
serial litigation advancing the time when public 
accommodations will be complaint with the ADA.261  
Courts should heed this warning and exercise caution when 
penalizing vexatious ADA litigants, but they should also use 
their judicial discretion as a non-legislative deterrent of truly 
abusive litigation. 
“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be 
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, 
respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Casmira Harrison, Federal Judge Deals Body Blow to Attorney at 
Center of Serial ADA Lawsuits, THE DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.news-journalonline.com/news/20190828/federal-judge-deals-
body-blow-to-attorney-at-center-of-serial-ada-lawsuits (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020) (describing the court’s ruling to sanction the attorney and return all 
money received) [https://perma.cc/GGM7-4CG8]. 
 260. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 
2007) (urging courts to refrain from presuming that serial litigation is 
necessarily vexatious).  
 261. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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lawful mandates . . . .”262 “These powers are ‘governed not by 
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases.’”263 Courts are granted the 
discretion and authority to impose sanctions on litigants who 
bring abusive litigation or attorneys who engage in the 
unethical practice of law.264 Federal courts hold the power to 
control admission to the federal bar and discipline attorneys 
who appear before them.265 Although the Supreme Court 
cautions that this power ought to be exercised with great 
caution, it is nevertheless available to all courts.266 
Judge Talamante’s dismissal of over 1,000 accessibility 
complaints demonstrates the potential danger of judicial 
discretion.267 Increasing judicial power may harm advocates 
attempting to enforce accessibility. Courts should be wary in 
making standing requirements more strenuous for ADA 
plaintiffs. Requiring disabled individuals to demonstrate real 
injuries at a heightened standard could create real hurdles for 
disabled individuals attempting to force compliance.268 Certain 
 
 262. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821). 
 263. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. 
Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). 
 264. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2018) (stating that persons who multiply 
proceedings “in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the 
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees 
reasonably incurred because of such conduct”). 
 265. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824) (stating that the power to 
discipline attorneys is incidental to all courts and necessary for the 
preservation of decorum and the respectability of the profession). 
 266. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50 (discussing a court’s “inherent power to 
impose attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct” and stating that a 
court must “exercise caution in invoking” that power).  
 267. See Press Release, Off. of Ariz. Attorney Gen. Mark Brnovich, supra 
note 177 (noting that Judge Talamante “dismissed more than 1,000 lawsuits 
filed by Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities”).  
 268. See Vanita Gupta, Oppose the “ADA Education and Reform Act of 
2017” (H.R. 620), THE LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (Feb. 14, 2018), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2018/oppose-hr-620-ada-
education-reform.pdf. (“H.R. 620 would impose a burdensome process before 
people with disabilities could file a civil action for an accessibility violation in 
a public accommodation case.”) [https://perma.cc/5PNU-SQP6]. 
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barriers may not be seen as “real and concrete” injuries when 
considered by able-bodied judges who have not had the 
experience of navigating the world in a disabled body. A judge 
may view a “barrier” as merely a minor technical violation, but 
even something minor can bar an individual with a lack of 
mobility from navigating a business.  
Alternatively, judges should turn their heightened 
discretion to attorneys. Several courts have begun to consider 
whether attorney’s fees should be withheld if no advance notice 
and opportunity to cure was given to the defendant.269 One court 
in California attempted to require a pre-litigation notice before 
allowing attorney’s fees in ADA cases, but this attempt at 
discretion was vacated by the Ninth Circuit.270 Still, courts 
continue to discuss whether plaintiffs provided notice to the 
defendant when deciding to grant judgment for the defendant 
or reduce attorney’s fees.271 
B. Court Approval of Settlements 
Congress can amend the ADA to mandate judicial approval 
of out-of-court settlements. New legislation could deter abusive 
litigants whose sole motives are to obtain monetary settlements 
 
 269. See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (denying attorney’s fees “when a pre-suit letter to the Defendant would 
have achieved the same result” (citing Macort v. Checker Drive-In Rests., Inc., 
No. 8:03-cv-1328-T-30EAJ 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2437, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 
28, 2005))).  
 270. See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 237 F. App’x 148, 149 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the district court should have either set a reasonable fee award 
or given specific, valid reasons for its denial of fees but “instead it denied fees 
by subjecting Doran to a requirement not found in the ADA or the case law”). 
 271. See Doran, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (“This court is not inclined to 
award attorney’s fees for prosecuting a lawsuit when a pre-suit letter to the 
Defendant would have achieved the same result.”); Rodriguez v. Investco, 
LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“There was no effort to 
communicate with the property owner to encourage voluntary compliance, no 
warning and no offer to forbear during a reasonable period of time while 
remedial measures are taken.”); Brother v. Miami Hotel Invs., Ltd., 341 F. 
Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“No effort was made to communicate 
with Defendant and seek compliance before suit, despite the fact that the only 
remedy in the act is injunctive relief. That is, aside from attorney’s fees . . . .”). 
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instead of fixing the business’s inaccessibility. Generally, 
“‘[f]ederal courts are not vested with a general power to review 
and approve settlements of suits between private parties,’ 
although a number of exceptions exist by both statute and 
rule.”272 There are several circumstances which warrant judicial 
approval of a settlement, including: (1) cases involving minors 
or wrongful death,273 (2) class action suits,274 and (3) when 
required by law, for example, in Fair Labor Standards Act or 
False Claims Act cases. These circumstances warrant judicial 
approval in order to protect the public interest.  
State law governs the judicial approval of settlements 
involving minors, parties who are incompetent or otherwise lack 
the capacity to waive rights knowingly and intelligently, and 
wrongful death cases.275 While states may vary on their policy, 
the root concern for courts is to protect the interest of minors 
and others unable to advocate for their interest.276 The public 
 
 272. Kanu v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. DKC 15-3445, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 89166, at *10–11 (D. Md. July 11, 2016) (quoting Estate of 
Sa’Adoon v. Prince, 660 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724–25 (E.D. Va. 2009)). 
 273. See generally Reed ex rel. Reed v. United States, 891 F.2d 878, 881 
n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Florida law requires court approval of all settlements 
involving a minor for the settlement to be effective.”); Goesel v. Boley Int’l 
(H.K.) Ltd., 9-6 F.3d 414, 419 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We join our colleagues in other 
federal courts in characterizing judicial approval of settlements involving 
minors as a matter of substantive law.”). 
 274. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for settlements of 
class actions). 
 275. Compare Kanu, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89166, at *10–11 (identifying 
Maryland law which determines the federal court does not have authority to 
approve settlements involving minors unless both parents are deceased and 
the next friend is not in loco parentis), with Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Lowman, 
No. 5:01-CV-891-BO(3), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29328, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 
2003) (“However, in a settlement involving minors, Local Civil Rule 17.1(b) 
requires the parties to prepare and submit a proposed Order of 
Approval . . . .”); see also Allianz Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 153 F.R.D. 89, 98 n. 4 (E.D. 
Va. 1994) (“New Jersey law requires court approval of settlements of infants’ 
claims . . . . The same is true in Virginia.”). 
 276. See Donnarumma v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 79 F.R.D. 455, 464 
(C.D. Cal. 1978) (“On the other hand, where minors are involved, the Court, 
whose root concern and responsibility is with protecting their interests, simply 
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has an interest in protecting those who cannot speak for 
themselves in litigation. Similarly, it is in the public interest to 
enforce accessibility and protect businesses from abusive 
litigation meant to extract cash settlements.  
Second, ADA lawsuits can be thought of as a type of class 
action. A class action is “a lawsuit in which the court authorizes 
a single person or a small group of people to represent the 
interests of a larger group.”277 Private lawsuits to enforce the 
ADA represent the interests of all individuals with disabilities 
and society’s interest in fair and equal treatment of all under 
the law. Class actions are governed under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 23.278 FRCP 23(e) regulates settlements of 
class action suits.279 After the parties have notified all members 
of the class of the proposed settlement, the court may approve 
the settlement “only after a hearing and only on a finding that 
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”280 By treating ADA 
settlements similarly to class action suits, courts can act as a 
safeguard to ensure proposed ADA settlements (1) are not a 
windfall for abusive litigants, (2) fix the litigated barrier, and 
(3) promote the interests of the ADA.  
Lastly, settlements under certain federal statutes, like the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and False Claims Act, must 
be approved for fairness by a district court.281 “The 
congressional purpose of the FLSA and the public’s interest in 
the transparency of the judicial process decisively inform both 
the procedure and the standard applicable to a district court’s 
review of an FLSA settlement.”282 This statement applies 
 
 277. Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 278. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
 279. See id. (providing the requirements of a class action suit). 
 280. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 281. See Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(“In accordance with the common law requirement that settlement of an FLSA 
claim be approved for fairness by a district court . . . .” (citing Lynn’s Food 
Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982))); United 
States ex rel. Pratt v. Alliant Techsystems, 50 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (C.D. Cal. 
1999) (reviewing a settlement agreement under the False Claims Act for 
whether it was “fair and reasonable”).  
 282. Dees v. Hydradry, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
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perfectly to the need for court approval of ADA settlements. 
Similarly, “where a private right is granted in the public 
interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so 
charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed 
where it would thwart the legislative policy with which it was 
designed to effectuate.”283 Courts should bear the responsibility 
of ensuring that disability rights, which are upheld through 
private suits, continue to protect public interests. 
C. Notice-and-Cure Legislative Action 
Ultimately, the legal profession and courts are limited in 
their ability to limit abusive ADA litigation. The ADA is 
functioning exactly as Congress intended.284 Without legislative 
action, abusive litigants will continue to exploit the legal system 
for monetary gain at the expense of business owners. The 
determination must be whether legislation should be passed on 
the state or federal level as well as what measures will protect 
business interests while safeguarding disability rights. 
Vexatious ADA litigation is arguably a state issue since 
accessibility lawsuits vary by state and correlate to states’ 
legislation; however, enacting uniform federal regulations may 
provide a more sensible and longer-lasting solution. 
Adding a notice-and-cure provision to the ADA will allow 
the “honest but unfortunate” business owner to act in good faith 
and fix their violations before being subject to costly litigation. 
Congress must determine (1) the requirements of the notice 
given to business owners, (2) the length of the cure period, and 
(3) the definition of a “cure.” To limit the burden on disabled 
individuals, the notice should only require “sufficient enough 
detail” for the business owner to identify the barrier or violation. 
The notice should not require additional burdens such as citing 
the specific code, explaining how the barrier prevented the 
 
 283. See Rogan v. Essex Cty. News Co., 65 F. Supp. 82, 83 (D.N.J. 1946) 
(refusing to approve a private settlement which had been negotiated without 
knowledge of the court, in absence of clear showing that statutory 
requirements had been met). 
 284. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the 
congressional intent to put enforcement in the hands of private citizens). 
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individual’s access, or whether the barrier is temporary or 
permanent.285  
How long, then, should business owners be allowed to “cure” 
their noncompliance? Disability advocates argue passionately 
against long “cure” periods since, in theory, they prescribe a set 
amount of time the disabled individual will not be able to access 
the facility. Cure periods have been proposed for thirty, sixty, 
and ninety days.286 Sixty or ninety days may seem like a long 
period of time, but the alternative solution—litigation—is a 
lengthy and extensive process which can take months or years. 
After litigation has concluded, the judge will then order the 
business to satisfy the injunctive relief of fixing the barrier 
within a certain amount of time. Litigation significantly 
prolongs the remedy of the violation. A defined period of thirty 
days to fix a barrier will incentivize business owners to comply 
quickly and avoid litigation.  
Suggested “cures” have included many options from fully 
eliminating the barrier to merely notifying the complainant of 
what the owner plans to do in the future.287 Violations which are 
fixable in thirty days should be completely cured as such. If the 
barrier requires construction work for removal, the owner shall 
obtain the proper permits, hire the appropriate renovator, and 
begin construction within thirty days. Owners should notify the 
complainant of the progress he has made and may have an 
additional thirty or sixty days depending on the appropriate 
amount of time to fully eliminate the barrier. Courts should be 
allowed the opportunity to consider extenuating circumstances 
of construction-related barriers in subsequent litigation. 
 
 285. But see H.R. 620, 115th Cong. (2017) (requiring a person encountering 
an access barrier to send written notice specifying in detail the circumstances 
under which access was denied, the property address, whether a request for 
assistance was made, and whether the barrier is permanent or temporary). 
 286. See supra notes 234–237 (discussing proposed notice requirements 
and cure periods).  
 287. See supra notes 234–238 (discussing various proposed threshold 
requirements of business owners’ mitigation efforts).  
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D. Encourage Lawyers to Self-Regulate 
As a last resort, judges can look to the legal community to 
self-regulate and sanction attorneys abusing the system.288 The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct direct attorneys to act 
ethically and professionally.289 The legal profession carries the 
burden of self-governance to keep attorneys accountable.290 To 
maintain the integrity of the profession, a lawyer who knows of 
misconduct by a fellow attorney “shall inform the appropriate 
professional authority.”291 Violating the Rules of Professional 
Conduct is professional misconduct.292 Under Rule 3.1, “[a] 
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is 
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .”293 
If an attorney’s repeat litigation of ADA claims rises to the level 
of being frivolous, a fellow attorney may report him to the state 
bar.294  
It is also professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”295 
An attorney abusing his power to bring ADA litigation for the 
purpose of attorney’s fees or hefty settlements may rise to the 
level of being prejudicial to the administration of justice.296 
 
 288. See supra notes 256–259 (discussing one case in which the court 
sanctioned counsel for frivolous litigation). 
 289. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE AND SCOPE 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 290. See id. (explaining the importance of self-governance among members 
of the legal profession).  
 291. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 292. See id. r. 8.4(a) (providing that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct”).  
 293. Id. r. 3.1. 
 294. See id. r. 8.3 (providing for peer reporting).  
 295. Id. r. 8.4(d). 
 296. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 COMMENT (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016) (discussing offenses that interfere with the administration of justice and 
stating that “[a] pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance 
when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.”); 
Phillips v. 180 Bklyn Livingston, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 325 (BMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 75154, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“This is not a case to vindicate a 
disabled person’s rights; it is a case brought to extract a money settlement 
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State bars are in place to maintain the integrity of the legal 
profession. Attorneys should be disciplined for exploiting the 
ADA solely for the benefit of attorney’s fees or monetary 
settlements that do not fix the litigated barriers.297 The legal 
profession has the means to penalize attorneys who take 
advantage of disabled individuals within legislative boundaries 
and should penalize those attorneys accordingly. 
V. Conclusion 
Abusive ADA litigation negatively affects not only business 
owners but the disability community and legal profession as 
well. The need for reform is apparent but should not come at the 
cost of equal rights for all Americans. The entire legal system 
must work together to eliminate unscrupulous plaintiffs’ ability 
to profit off unsuspecting businesses without placing further 




from a restaurant in Brooklyn, with plaintiff exploiting the ADA’s 
jurisdictional hook to achieve that goal.”). 
 297. See id. (reading the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to disavow 
this as behavior that would be prejudicial to the administration of justice).  
